Geographic Inequity in a Decentralized Anti-Poverty Program : A Case Study of China
The central governments of many developing countries have chosen to decentralize their anti-poverty programs, in the expectation that local agents are better informed about local needs. The paper shows that this potential advantage of decentralized...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8042377/geographic-inequity-decentralized-anti-poverty-program-case-study-china http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7499 |
Summary: | The central governments of many
developing countries have chosen to decentralize their
anti-poverty programs, in the expectation that local agents
are better informed about local needs. The paper shows that
this potential advantage of decentralized eligibility
criteria can come at a large cost, to the extent that the
induced geographic inequities undermine performance in
reaching the income- poor nationally. These issues are
studied empirically for (probably) the largest
transfer-based poverty program in the world, namely
China's Di Bao program, which aims to assure a minimum
income through means-tested transfers. Poor municipalities
are found to adopt systematically lower eligibility
thresholds, reducing the program's ability to reach
poor areas, and generating considerable horizontal inequity. |
---|