Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice
The degree to which a labor market is segmented and jobs in the formal sector of the economy are rationed is critical to the analysis of coverage of social insurance and pensions. Using unique panel data spanning the 1998-99 contraction in Chile, t...
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2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/05/7585352/workers-chile-choose-informal-employment-dynamic-analysis-sector-choice http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7121 |
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okr-10986-71212021-04-23T14:02:33Z Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice Packard, Truman G. AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE INCOME BONUSES DISABILITY DISCUSSIONS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EMPLOYERS EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT TRENDS ENTREPRENEURIAL ABILITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME SECURITY INFORMAL ECONOMY INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT INFORMAL SECTOR JOB SATISFACTION JOB SECURITY JOB SEEKERS JOB TRAINING JOBS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET FUNCTIONS LABOR MARKET OUTCOME LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOVEMENT LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LABOR REGULATIONS LABOR SUPPLY LABOR UNIONS LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT MANDATED BENEFITS MINIMUM WAGE NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT OCCUPATION PAYING JOBS PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE PREVIOUS SECTION PRIMARY EDUCATION RETIREMENT SAFETY NET SALARIED EMPLOYEES SALARIED EMPLOYMENT SALARIED WORKERS SELFEMPLOYMENT SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SECURITY TRAINING COSTS TRAINING INSTITUTION TURNOVER UNEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYMENT WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WAGE EMPLOYMENT WAGE SET WORK EXPERIENCE WORK IN PROGRESS WORKER WORKERS WORKING WORKING POPULATION YOUNGER WORKERS The degree to which a labor market is segmented and jobs in the formal sector of the economy are rationed is critical to the analysis of coverage of social insurance and pensions. Using unique panel data spanning the 1998-99 contraction in Chile, the author finds little evidence that self-employment is the residual sector of a dualistic labor market, as is often depicted in the literature. Data on transitions between sectors show that self-employment is not a free-entry sector, and that entrepreneurs can be "pushed" out of self-employment just as others are pushed out of formal employment during economic downturns. But employment without a contract does exhibit many of the features of the free-entry, employment safety net depicted in the dualistic literature. An annex to this paper presents supportive evidence from static analysis of selection-corrected wage differentials and a comment on the drawbacks of this approach. 2012-06-05T16:12:26Z 2012-06-05T16:12:26Z 2007-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/05/7585352/workers-chile-choose-informal-employment-dynamic-analysis-sector-choice http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7121 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4232 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Chile |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE INCOME BONUSES DISABILITY DISCUSSIONS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EMPLOYERS EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT TRENDS ENTREPRENEURIAL ABILITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME SECURITY INFORMAL ECONOMY INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT INFORMAL SECTOR JOB SATISFACTION JOB SECURITY JOB SEEKERS JOB TRAINING JOBS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET FUNCTIONS LABOR MARKET OUTCOME LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOVEMENT LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LABOR REGULATIONS LABOR SUPPLY LABOR UNIONS LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT MANDATED BENEFITS MINIMUM WAGE NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT OCCUPATION PAYING JOBS PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE PREVIOUS SECTION PRIMARY EDUCATION RETIREMENT SAFETY NET SALARIED EMPLOYEES SALARIED EMPLOYMENT SALARIED WORKERS SELFEMPLOYMENT SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SECURITY TRAINING COSTS TRAINING INSTITUTION TURNOVER UNEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYMENT WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WAGE EMPLOYMENT WAGE SET WORK EXPERIENCE WORK IN PROGRESS WORKER WORKERS WORKING WORKING POPULATION YOUNGER WORKERS |
spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE INCOME BONUSES DISABILITY DISCUSSIONS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EMPLOYERS EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT TRENDS ENTREPRENEURIAL ABILITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME SECURITY INFORMAL ECONOMY INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT INFORMAL SECTOR JOB SATISFACTION JOB SECURITY JOB SEEKERS JOB TRAINING JOBS LABOR ECONOMICS LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET FUNCTIONS LABOR MARKET OUTCOME LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOVEMENT LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LABOR REGULATIONS LABOR SUPPLY LABOR UNIONS LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT MANDATED BENEFITS MINIMUM WAGE NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT OCCUPATION PAYING JOBS PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE PREVIOUS SECTION PRIMARY EDUCATION RETIREMENT SAFETY NET SALARIED EMPLOYEES SALARIED EMPLOYMENT SALARIED WORKERS SELFEMPLOYMENT SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL SECURITY TRAINING COSTS TRAINING INSTITUTION TURNOVER UNEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYMENT WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WAGE EMPLOYMENT WAGE SET WORK EXPERIENCE WORK IN PROGRESS WORKER WORKERS WORKING WORKING POPULATION YOUNGER WORKERS Packard, Truman G. Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice |
geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Chile |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4232 |
description |
The degree to which a labor market is
segmented and jobs in the formal sector of the economy are
rationed is critical to the analysis of coverage of social
insurance and pensions. Using unique panel data spanning the
1998-99 contraction in Chile, the author finds little
evidence that self-employment is the residual sector of a
dualistic labor market, as is often depicted in the
literature. Data on transitions between sectors show that
self-employment is not a free-entry sector, and that
entrepreneurs can be "pushed" out of
self-employment just as others are pushed out of formal
employment during economic downturns. But employment without
a contract does exhibit many of the features of the
free-entry, employment safety net depicted in the dualistic
literature. An annex to this paper presents supportive
evidence from static analysis of selection-corrected wage
differentials and a comment on the drawbacks of this approach. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Packard, Truman G. |
author_facet |
Packard, Truman G. |
author_sort |
Packard, Truman G. |
title |
Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice |
title_short |
Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice |
title_full |
Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice |
title_fullStr |
Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice |
title_full_unstemmed |
Do Workers in Chile Choose Informal Employment? A Dynamic Analysis of Sector Choice |
title_sort |
do workers in chile choose informal employment? a dynamic analysis of sector choice |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/05/7585352/workers-chile-choose-informal-employment-dynamic-analysis-sector-choice http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7121 |
_version_ |
1764401938566217728 |