Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?

For a large number of companies from different countries, the authors analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. They confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial r...

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Main Authors:	Bruno, Valentina G., Claessens, Stijn
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISIONS AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CASH FLOWS CHAIRMAN AND CEO CHARTER CHARTER AMENDMENTS CHARTERS COMPANY COMPANY LAWS CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS CONSTITUTION CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA DEGREE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEABILITY FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANIES GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE DATA GOVERNANCE INDICATOR GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INCORPORATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER INTERNAL AUDIT INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE COMPANIES LEGAL DISPUTES LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MANAGERS MERGERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POISON PILLS POLITICIANS PROXY PROXY CONTEST PROXY STATEMENT PUBLIC OPINION REGULATORY BURDENS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES REVERSE CAUSALITY SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALLER COMPANIES STOCK MARKETS SUPPLIERS TAKEOVER TAKEOVERS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURE VOTING
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/03/7600950/corporate-governance-regulation-can-too-much-good-thing http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7117

id	okr-10986-7117
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-71172021-04-23T14:02:33Z Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? Bruno, Valentina G. Claessens, Stijn ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISIONS AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CASH FLOWS CHAIRMAN AND CEO CHARTER CHARTER AMENDMENTS CHARTERS COMPANY COMPANY LAWS CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS CONSTITUTION CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA DEGREE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEABILITY FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANIES GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE DATA GOVERNANCE INDICATOR GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INCORPORATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER INTERNAL AUDIT INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE COMPANIES LEGAL DISPUTES LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MANAGERS MERGERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POISON PILLS POLITICIANS PROXY PROXY CONTEST PROXY STATEMENT PUBLIC OPINION REGULATORY BURDENS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES REVERSE CAUSALITY SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALLER COMPANIES STOCK MARKETS SUPPLIERS TAKEOVER TAKEOVERS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURE VOTING For a large number of companies from different countries, the authors analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. They confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder protection, and consequently positively impacts valuation. They find substitution in valuation impact between corporate governance measures at the company and country level, with a possibility of over-regulation. Corporate governance appears more valuable for companies that rely heavily on external financing, consistent with the hypothesis that the main role of corporate governance is to protect external financiers. 2012-06-05T16:03:36Z 2012-06-05T16:03:36Z 2007-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/03/7600950/corporate-governance-regulation-can-too-much-good-thing http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7117 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4140 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISIONS AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CASH FLOWS CHAIRMAN AND CEO CHARTER CHARTER AMENDMENTS CHARTERS COMPANY COMPANY LAWS CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS CONSTITUTION CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA DEGREE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEABILITY FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANIES GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE DATA GOVERNANCE INDICATOR GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INCORPORATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER INTERNAL AUDIT INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE COMPANIES LEGAL DISPUTES LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MANAGERS MERGERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POISON PILLS POLITICIANS PROXY PROXY CONTEST PROXY STATEMENT PUBLIC OPINION REGULATORY BURDENS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES REVERSE CAUSALITY SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALLER COMPANIES STOCK MARKETS SUPPLIERS TAKEOVER TAKEOVERS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURE VOTING
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISIONS AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUTHORITY BOARD MEMBERS BOOK VALUE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CAPITAL MARKETS CASH FLOWS CHAIRMAN AND CEO CHARTER CHARTER AMENDMENTS CHARTERS COMPANY COMPANY LAWS CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS CONSTITUTION CORPORATE FAILURES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATIONS CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA DEGREE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION DISCLOSURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEABILITY FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCING CONSTRAINTS FIRMS FOREIGN COMPANIES GOLDEN PARACHUTES GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE DATA GOVERNANCE INDICATOR GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT POLICIES INCORPORATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER INTERNAL AUDIT INVESTOR PROTECTION LARGE COMPANIES LEGAL DISPUTES LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL REQUIREMENTS LEGAL SYSTEMS LIMITED MAJORITY VOTE MANAGERS MERGERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POISON PILLS POLITICIANS PROXY PROXY CONTEST PROXY STATEMENT PUBLIC OPINION REGULATORY BURDENS REGULATORY INTERVENTION REGULATORY REGIMES REVERSE CAUSALITY SHARE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER MEETING SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COMPANIES SMALLER COMPANIES STOCK MARKETS SUPPLIERS TAKEOVER TAKEOVERS TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURE VOTING Bruno, Valentina G. Claessens, Stijn Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4140
description	For a large number of companies from different countries, the authors analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. They confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder protection, and consequently positively impacts valuation. They find substitution in valuation impact between corporate governance measures at the company and country level, with a possibility of over-regulation. Corporate governance appears more valuable for companies that rely heavily on external financing, consistent with the hypothesis that the main role of corporate governance is to protect external financiers.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Bruno, Valentina G. Claessens, Stijn
author_facet	Bruno, Valentina G. Claessens, Stijn
author_sort	Bruno, Valentina G.
title	Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?
title_short	Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?
title_full	Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?
title_fullStr	Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?
title_full_unstemmed	Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?
title_sort	corporate governance and regulation : can there be too much of a good thing?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/03/7600950/corporate-governance-regulation-can-too-much-good-thing http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7117
_version_	1764401930622205952

Corporate Governance and Regulation : Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?

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