Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies
This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that le...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7499620/insurgency-credible-commitment-autocracies-democracies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7012 |
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okr-10986-70122021-04-23T14:02:33Z Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies Keefer, Philip ARMED CONFLICT AUTOCRACY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CANDIDATES CITIZEN CITIZENS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COMMUNISM COMPETITION COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICTS DECISION MAKING DEGREES OF FREEDOM DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY SCORE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DETERMINANT OF INCOME PER CAPITA DISLOYALTY ELECTIONS ELECTORATE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION ETHNIC GROUPS EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FAMILY MEMBERS FAMILY TIES GDP GOVERNMENT CAPACITY HIGH RISK INCOME INCOME PER CAPITA MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT MILITARY SPENDING NATURAL ENDOWMENTS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES OPPONENTS PARLIAMENT PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIANS POPULAR SUPPORT POPULATION POPULATION SIZE POST-CONFLICT PRINT MEDIA PROGRESS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY QUALITY OF EDUCATION REBEL MOVEMENTS REBELLION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RICHER COUNTRIES RISK OF CONFLICT RULE OF LAW SECONDARY SCHOOL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY SOCIAL CONDITIONS SOCIAL GROUP SOCIAL POLARIZATION SOCIAL WELFARE SOVEREIGNTY VOTERS WARS This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions. 2012-06-04T17:52:44Z 2012-06-04T17:52:44Z 2007-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7499620/insurgency-credible-commitment-autocracies-democracies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7012 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4185 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ARMED CONFLICT AUTOCRACY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CANDIDATES CITIZEN CITIZENS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COMMUNISM COMPETITION COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICTS DECISION MAKING DEGREES OF FREEDOM DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY SCORE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DETERMINANT OF INCOME PER CAPITA DISLOYALTY ELECTIONS ELECTORATE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION ETHNIC GROUPS EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FAMILY MEMBERS FAMILY TIES GDP GOVERNMENT CAPACITY HIGH RISK INCOME INCOME PER CAPITA MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT MILITARY SPENDING NATURAL ENDOWMENTS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES OPPONENTS PARLIAMENT PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIANS POPULAR SUPPORT POPULATION POPULATION SIZE POST-CONFLICT PRINT MEDIA PROGRESS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY QUALITY OF EDUCATION REBEL MOVEMENTS REBELLION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RICHER COUNTRIES RISK OF CONFLICT RULE OF LAW SECONDARY SCHOOL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY SOCIAL CONDITIONS SOCIAL GROUP SOCIAL POLARIZATION SOCIAL WELFARE SOVEREIGNTY VOTERS WARS |
| spellingShingle |
ARMED CONFLICT AUTOCRACY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CANDIDATES CITIZEN CITIZENS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COMMUNISM COMPETITION COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICTS DECISION MAKING DEGREES OF FREEDOM DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY SCORE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DETERMINANT OF INCOME PER CAPITA DISLOYALTY ELECTIONS ELECTORATE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION ETHNIC GROUPS EXPECTED VALUE EXPORTS FAMILY MEMBERS FAMILY TIES GDP GOVERNMENT CAPACITY HIGH RISK INCOME INCOME PER CAPITA MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT MILITARY SPENDING NATURAL ENDOWMENTS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES OPPONENTS PARLIAMENT PATRONAGE POLICY MAKING POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL DECISION MAKING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VARIABLES POLITICIANS POPULAR SUPPORT POPULATION POPULATION SIZE POST-CONFLICT PRINT MEDIA PROGRESS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY QUALITY OF EDUCATION REBEL MOVEMENTS REBELLION RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESPECT RICHER COUNTRIES RISK OF CONFLICT RULE OF LAW SECONDARY SCHOOL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY SOCIAL CONDITIONS SOCIAL GROUP SOCIAL POLARIZATION SOCIAL WELFARE SOVEREIGNTY VOTERS WARS Keefer, Philip Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4185 |
| description |
This paper suggests a new factor that
makes civil war more likely: the inability of political
actors to make credible promises to broad segments of
society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected
governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less
well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these
actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency
capacity in the first place, since they are less able to
prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But
while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing
credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of
natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war.
Empirical tests using various measures of political
credibility support these conclusions. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
| title_short |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
| title_full |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
| title_fullStr |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
| title_sort |
insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7499620/insurgency-credible-commitment-autocracies-democracies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7012 |
| _version_ |
1764401741257768960 |