Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition
The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in pow...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9911985/political-alternation-restraint-investing-influence-evidence-post-communist-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932 |
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okr-10986-69322021-04-23T14:02:32Z Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale ACCOUNTABILITY ASSASSINATION AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BINDING CONSTRAINT BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COALITIONS COLLAPSE COLLAPSES COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPOSITE INDICATORS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTIONALISM CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS CREDIT RATING CRIMINAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS CULTURAL IDENTITY DECREE DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS DEMOCRATIZATION EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL RULES EMERGING MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FREE TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE MEASURE GOVERNANCE MEASURES GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAND CORRUPTION IDEOLOGIES IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME LEVEL INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PEACE JAIL JUDICIAL DECISIONS JUDICIARY LABOR UNIONS LAW INDEX LAW INDICATOR LAWS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATURE LIBERALIZATION LIBERALIZATIONS LOCAL LEVELS LOWER HOUSE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARKET ECONOMY MEDIA NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES NEW MARKET OWNERSHIP RIGHTS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PER CAPITA INCOME PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ISSUES POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL POWERS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL PROCESSES POLITICAL REGIMES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRESIDENCY PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDING RATE OF RETURN REGIME CHANGE REPUBLICS RESOURCE CURSE RULE OF LAW SAFETY NETS SANCTIONS SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIALISM STATE ASSETS STATE CAPTURE STATE CONTROL STATE GOVERNMENT STATE OWNERSHIP STRONG GOVERNANCE TAXATION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TURNOVER TURNOVERS UPPER HOUSE URBANIZATION URBANIZATION RATE VETO VETO POWER WESTERN EUROPE WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD POLITICS The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power. 2012-06-01T21:01:25Z 2012-06-01T21:01:25Z 2008-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9911985/political-alternation-restraint-investing-influence-evidence-post-communist-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4747 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ASSASSINATION AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BINDING CONSTRAINT BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COALITIONS COLLAPSE COLLAPSES COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPOSITE INDICATORS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTIONALISM CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS CREDIT RATING CRIMINAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS CULTURAL IDENTITY DECREE DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS DEMOCRATIZATION EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL RULES EMERGING MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FREE TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE MEASURE GOVERNANCE MEASURES GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAND CORRUPTION IDEOLOGIES IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME LEVEL INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PEACE JAIL JUDICIAL DECISIONS JUDICIARY LABOR UNIONS LAW INDEX LAW INDICATOR LAWS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATURE LIBERALIZATION LIBERALIZATIONS LOCAL LEVELS LOWER HOUSE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARKET ECONOMY MEDIA NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES NEW MARKET OWNERSHIP RIGHTS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PER CAPITA INCOME PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ISSUES POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL POWERS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL PROCESSES POLITICAL REGIMES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRESIDENCY PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDING RATE OF RETURN REGIME CHANGE REPUBLICS RESOURCE CURSE RULE OF LAW SAFETY NETS SANCTIONS SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIALISM STATE ASSETS STATE CAPTURE STATE CONTROL STATE GOVERNMENT STATE OWNERSHIP STRONG GOVERNANCE TAXATION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TURNOVER TURNOVERS UPPER HOUSE URBANIZATION URBANIZATION RATE VETO VETO POWER WESTERN EUROPE WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD POLITICS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ASSASSINATION AUTHORITARIANISM AUTHORITY BINDING CONSTRAINT BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COALITIONS COLLAPSE COLLAPSES COMMUNISM COMMUNIST COMMUNIST PARTY COMPOSITE INDICATORS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTIONALISM CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION COUNTRY DUMMIES COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS CREDIT RATING CRIMINAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS CULTURAL IDENTITY DECREE DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS DEMOCRATIZATION EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REFORMS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL RULES EMERGING MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FREE TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE MEASURE GOVERNANCE MEASURES GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT SERVICES GRAND CORRUPTION IDEOLOGIES IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME LEVEL INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PEACE JAIL JUDICIAL DECISIONS JUDICIARY LABOR UNIONS LAW INDEX LAW INDICATOR LAWS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATURE LIBERALIZATION LIBERALIZATIONS LOCAL LEVELS LOWER HOUSE MACROECONOMIC POLICY MARKET ECONOMY MEDIA NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES NEW MARKET OWNERSHIP RIGHTS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PER CAPITA INCOME PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY ISSUES POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL POWERS POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL PROCESSES POLITICAL REGIMES POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRESIDENCY PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GAIN PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDING RATE OF RETURN REGIME CHANGE REPUBLICS RESOURCE CURSE RULE OF LAW SAFETY NETS SANCTIONS SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIALISM STATE ASSETS STATE CAPTURE STATE CONTROL STATE GOVERNMENT STATE OWNERSHIP STRONG GOVERNANCE TAXATION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TURNOVER TURNOVERS UPPER HOUSE URBANIZATION URBANIZATION RATE VETO VETO POWER WESTERN EUROPE WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD POLITICS Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4747 |
| description |
The authors develop and implement a
method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among
distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is
comparable across political systems. The authors find that
more frequent alternation in power is associated with the
emergence of better governance in post communist countries.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms
seek durable protection from the state, which implies that
expected political alternation is relevant to the decision
whether to invest in influence with the governing party or,
alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable
rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party
in power. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale |
| author_facet |
Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale |
| author_sort |
Milanovic, Branko |
| title |
Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition |
| title_short |
Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition |
| title_full |
Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition |
| title_fullStr |
Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition |
| title_sort |
political alternation as a restraint on investing in influence : evidence from the post-communist transition |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9911985/political-alternation-restraint-investing-influence-evidence-post-communist-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932 |
| _version_ |
1764401343472074752 |