Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization
The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin Amer...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/07/9699795/safeguards-antidumping-latin-american-trade-liberalization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6817 |
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okr-10986-68172021-04-23T14:02:32Z Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization Finger, J. Michael Nogues, Julio J. ANTIDUMPING CENTRALIZED CONTROL COST CONCEPT INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS TARIFF RATES TRADE LIBERALIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not. 2012-05-31T21:42:06Z 2012-05-31T21:42:06Z 2008-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/07/9699795/safeguards-antidumping-latin-american-trade-liberalization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6817 English Policy Research Working Paper No. 4680 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ANTIDUMPING CENTRALIZED CONTROL COST CONCEPT INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS TARIFF RATES TRADE LIBERALIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION |
| spellingShingle |
ANTIDUMPING CENTRALIZED CONTROL COST CONCEPT INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS TARIFF RATES TRADE LIBERALIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Finger, J. Michael Nogues, Julio J. Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4680 |
| description |
The binding of tariff rates and adoption
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade
Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping
mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of
instruments of protection in the Latin American countries
discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in
maintaining centralized control over the management of
pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide
accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's
procedural requirements (for example, to follow published
criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped
leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one
based on relationships to one based on objective criteria.
However, when Latin American governments attempted to
introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on
an economically sensible measure of long-run international
price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept
that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the
rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade
Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria,
nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries)
include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of
the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Finger, J. Michael Nogues, Julio J. |
| author_facet |
Finger, J. Michael Nogues, Julio J. |
| author_sort |
Finger, J. Michael |
| title |
Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization |
| title_short |
Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization |
| title_full |
Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization |
| title_fullStr |
Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization |
| title_sort |
safeguards and antidumping in latin american trade liberalization |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/07/9699795/safeguards-antidumping-latin-american-trade-liberalization http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6817 |
| _version_ |
1764400907305353216 |