Referendum, Response, and Consequences for Sudan : The Game between Juba and Khartoum

Referendum, Response, and Consequences for Sudan : The Game between Juba and Khartoum

This paper presents a game theory model of the strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba leading up to the referendum on Sudan's partition in 2011. The findings show that excessive militarization and brinksmanship is a rational response...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Elbadawi, Ibrahim, Milante, Gary, Pischedda, Costantino
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING ALIGNMENT ALLIANCE ALLIANCES ANNUAL EXPENDITURES APPROPRIATION ARMED FORCES ARMS ARMS RACE ARMY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BID BOUNDARIES BOUNDARY BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES CITIZENS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMITMENT DEVICE CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICTS CONSTRAINT CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE COST OF WAR COUNTERPARTS CREDIBILITY CRISES DEATHS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DEFENSE DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DISABILITY DISEASES DISPUTES DIVORCE DRINKING WATER DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES EDUCATION EXPENDITURES ELECTIONS FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT REVENUES HEALTH EXPENDITURES HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH SPENDING HOLDING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMF INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LIVE BIRTHS MALARIA MARGINAL BENEFITS MATERNAL MORTALITY MATERNAL MORTALITY RATIO MEASLES MEASLES IMMUNIZATION MEDIATION MEETINGS MILITARIZATION MILITARY EXPENDITURE MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY GOVERNMENT MILITARY POWER MILITARY SPENDING MILITIAS MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS MODALITIES NATIONAL SECURITY NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES NEGOTIATIONS NET PRESENT VALUE OBSERVERS OIL RESERVES OIL RESOURCES OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS PEACE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PEACE PROCESS PEACE PROCESSES PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE PEACEKEEPING POLICY BRIEF POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL RIGHTS POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL VIOLENCE POLITICIANS POPULATION CENSUS PRIMARY EDUCATION PRIMARY SCHOOL PRINCIPAL-AGENT PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM PROGRESS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC MONEY PUBLIC SPENDING REBEL RECONSTRUCTION REFERENDUM REFUGEE REPATRIATION RESPECT RETURN RETURNS REVENUE SHARING RISK NEUTRAL ROAD ROADS RULE OF LAW SAFETY NET SANITATION SANITATION FACILITIES SCARCE RESOURCES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SELF-DETERMINATION SERVICE DELIVERY SKILLED PERSONNEL SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL SECTOR SOCIAL SERVICE SOLDIER STRATEGIC PLANNING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TAX TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TERRORISM TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORTATION UNCERTAINTY UNDERDEVELOPMENT UTILITY FUNCTIONS VALUE OF EXPORTS VIOLENCE VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/07/9738591/referendum-response-consequences-sudan-game-between-juba-khartoum http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6816

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Summary:	This paper presents a game theory model of the strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba leading up to the referendum on Sudan's partition in 2011. The findings show that excessive militarization and brinksmanship is a rational response for both actors, neither of which can credibly commit to lower levels of military spending under the current status quo. This militarization is often at the expense of health and education expenditures, suggesting that the opportunity cost of militarization is foregone economic development. These credibility issues might be resolved by democratization, increased transparency, reduction of information asymmetries, and efforts to promote economic and political cooperation. The paper explores these devices, demonstrating how they can contribute to Pareto preferred outcomes in equilibrium. The authors characterize the military expenditure associated with the commitment problem experienced by both sides, estimate its costs from data for Sudan, and identify the opportunity cost of foregone development implied by continued, excessive, and unsustainable militarization.

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