Helpful Governments
This paper provides an alternative way of testing the theory of legal origins, one based on a firm's perception of how helpful the government is for doing business. The author argues that an approach based on firm perceptions offers a number o...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9075950/helpful-governments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6567 |
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okr-10986-65672021-04-23T14:02:31Z Helpful Governments Amin, Mohammad BRIBE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CHECKS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONFIDENCE CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COUNTRY RISK CREDITOR CREDITOR RIGHTS DICTATORSHIP DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES EXTERNAL FINANCE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS LEGAL FORMALISM LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGAL STRUCTURE LEGAL SYSTEM LEGAL TRADITION LEGAL TRADITIONS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE LOWER HOUSE MICRO DATA MULTINATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POOR GOVERNANCE PRESIDENCY PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAU PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION PUBLIC REGISTRY REGULATORY MEASURES REMEDY TRANSITION COUNTRIES WESTERN EUROPE This paper provides an alternative way of testing the theory of legal origins, one based on a firm's perception of how helpful the government is for doing business. The author argues that an approach based on firm perceptions offers a number of advantages over existing studies. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that heavier regulation in civil law compared with common law countries is not viewed by businesses as an efficient and socially desirable response to disorder. Further, the findings show a strong effect of legal tradition on government helpfulness even after controlling for various institutional measures known to be correlated with the legal tradition of countries. This suggests that there is more to legal tradition than what existing studies have unearthed. 2012-05-29T17:39:27Z 2012-05-29T17:39:27Z 2008-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9075950/helpful-governments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6567 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4557 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
BRIBE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CHECKS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONFIDENCE CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COUNTRY RISK CREDITOR CREDITOR RIGHTS DICTATORSHIP DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES EXTERNAL FINANCE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS LEGAL FORMALISM LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGAL STRUCTURE LEGAL SYSTEM LEGAL TRADITION LEGAL TRADITIONS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE LOWER HOUSE MICRO DATA MULTINATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POOR GOVERNANCE PRESIDENCY PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAU PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION PUBLIC REGISTRY REGULATORY MEASURES REMEDY TRANSITION COUNTRIES WESTERN EUROPE |
| spellingShingle |
BRIBE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CHECKS CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CONFIDENCE CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COUNTRY RISK CREDITOR CREDITOR RIGHTS DICTATORSHIP DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES EXTERNAL FINANCE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTOR PROTECTION LAWS LEGAL FORMALISM LEGAL ORIGIN LEGAL ORIGINS LEGAL STRUCTURE LEGAL SYSTEM LEGAL TRADITION LEGAL TRADITIONS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE LOWER HOUSE MICRO DATA MULTINATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POOR GOVERNANCE PRESIDENCY PRIVATE CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT BUREAU PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION PUBLIC REGISTRY REGULATORY MEASURES REMEDY TRANSITION COUNTRIES WESTERN EUROPE Amin, Mohammad Helpful Governments |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4557 |
| description |
This paper provides an alternative way
of testing the theory of legal origins, one based on a
firm's perception of how helpful the government is for
doing business. The author argues that an approach based on
firm perceptions offers a number of advantages over existing
studies. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates that
heavier regulation in civil law compared with common law
countries is not viewed by businesses as an efficient and
socially desirable response to disorder. Further, the
findings show a strong effect of legal tradition on
government helpfulness even after controlling for various
institutional measures known to be correlated with the legal
tradition of countries. This suggests that there is more to
legal tradition than what existing studies have unearthed. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Amin, Mohammad |
| author_facet |
Amin, Mohammad |
| author_sort |
Amin, Mohammad |
| title |
Helpful Governments |
| title_short |
Helpful Governments |
| title_full |
Helpful Governments |
| title_fullStr |
Helpful Governments |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Helpful Governments |
| title_sort |
helpful governments |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9075950/helpful-governments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6567 |
| _version_ |
1764400516083744768 |