The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries
This paper aims to shed some new light on the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of Boards of Directors of state owned enterprises with a focus on infrastructure sectors. In the case of developing countries, empirical studies have found...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9292611/effectiveness-boards-directors-state-owned-enterprises-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6508 |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ALLEGIANCE ARTICLE OF ASSOCIATION ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUDITS AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY LAW BARGAINING POWER BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARD MEMBERSHIP BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BONDS BUDGET DEFICIT BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS LAWYER CAPITAL EXPENDITURE CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CEOS CHARTERS CHIEF EXECUTIVE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS CIVIL CODE COMMON LAW COMPANIES ACT COMPANY COMPANY LAW COMPANY LAWS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE BOARD CORPORATE BOARDS CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE LAW CORPORATE LAW REFORMS CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL CUSTOMER SERVICE DATA AVAILABILITY DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DELAWARE DELEGATION OF POWERS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING MARKETS DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE DISCLOSURE DIVIDEND DIVIDEND POLICY DIVIDENDS DOMESTIC COMPANIES DUTY OF CARE DUTY OF LOYALTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMERGING MARKETS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ENTERPRISE REFORM EQUITY CAPITAL EQUITY MARKET EX POST FEDERAL SECURITIES FIDUCIARY DUTY FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL STATEMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FIRM PERFORMANCE FIRM-LEVEL GOVERNANCE FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL POLICIES FOREIGN FIRMS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE INDEXES GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITIES GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET INCENTIVE COMPENSATION INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INCORPORATED INDEPENDENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INSIDE INFORMATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNAL CONTROLS INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT STOCK] COMPANIES LABOR UNIONS LARGE SHAREHOLDER LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL TRANSPLANTS LEGISLATION LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LIMITED LITTLE ATTENTION LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARKET STRUCTURES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OUTPUT OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE MEASURES POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PORTFOLIOS PRICE DISTORTIONS PRINCIPAL-AGENT PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE ENTITY PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PRIVATIZATION PROXY PUBLIC CORPORATION PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS RATIONALIZATION REGULATOR REPRESENTATIVES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS REVENUE COLLECTION REVOLUTION RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS RISK MANAGEMENT SCANDAL SECURITIES LAWS SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATORS SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP SHARE PRICE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH SHAREHOLDERS STAKEHOLDERS STATE AID STATE CORPORATE LAW STATE ENTERPRISES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK OPTIONS STOCK PRICE SUCCESSOR COMPANIES SUCCESSOR ENTITIES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAXATION TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURES TREASURY TURNOVER TURNOVERS UNIVERSAL ACCESS URBAN DEVELOPMENT |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ALLEGIANCE ARTICLE OF ASSOCIATION ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUDITS AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY LAW BARGAINING POWER BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARD MEMBERSHIP BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BONDS BUDGET DEFICIT BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS LAWYER CAPITAL EXPENDITURE CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CEOS CHARTERS CHIEF EXECUTIVE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS CIVIL CODE COMMON LAW COMPANIES ACT COMPANY COMPANY LAW COMPANY LAWS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE BOARD CORPORATE BOARDS CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE LAW CORPORATE LAW REFORMS CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL CUSTOMER SERVICE DATA AVAILABILITY DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DELAWARE DELEGATION OF POWERS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING MARKETS DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE DISCLOSURE DIVIDEND DIVIDEND POLICY DIVIDENDS DOMESTIC COMPANIES DUTY OF CARE DUTY OF LOYALTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMERGING MARKETS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ENTERPRISE REFORM EQUITY CAPITAL EQUITY MARKET EX POST FEDERAL SECURITIES FIDUCIARY DUTY FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL STATEMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FIRM PERFORMANCE FIRM-LEVEL GOVERNANCE FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL POLICIES FOREIGN FIRMS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE INDEXES GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITIES GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET INCENTIVE COMPENSATION INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INCORPORATED INDEPENDENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INSIDE INFORMATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNAL CONTROLS INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT STOCK] COMPANIES LABOR UNIONS LARGE SHAREHOLDER LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL TRANSPLANTS LEGISLATION LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LIMITED LITTLE ATTENTION LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARKET STRUCTURES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OUTPUT OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE MEASURES POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PORTFOLIOS PRICE DISTORTIONS PRINCIPAL-AGENT PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE ENTITY PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PRIVATIZATION PROXY PUBLIC CORPORATION PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS RATIONALIZATION REGULATOR REPRESENTATIVES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS REVENUE COLLECTION REVOLUTION RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS RISK MANAGEMENT SCANDAL SECURITIES LAWS SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATORS SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP SHARE PRICE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH SHAREHOLDERS STAKEHOLDERS STATE AID STATE CORPORATE LAW STATE ENTERPRISES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK OPTIONS STOCK PRICE SUCCESSOR COMPANIES SUCCESSOR ENTITIES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAXATION TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURES TREASURY TURNOVER TURNOVERS UNIVERSAL ACCESS URBAN DEVELOPMENT Vagliasindi, Maria The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4579 |
description |
This paper aims to shed some new light
on the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of
Boards of Directors of state owned enterprises with a focus
on infrastructure sectors. In the case of developing
countries, empirical studies have found evidence of positive
links between the composition of the Board of Directors and
financial performance. Yet the lack of solid theoretical
foundations, and in some cases poor data availability, makes
the conclusions of most studies weak. Several policy
recommendations emerge from the review of the economic
literature and evidence from case studies. First, the
introduction of a sufficient number of independent directors
emerges as an important corporate governance milestone.
Empowering them to exercise effective monitoring of
management, however, may prove to be a formidable challenge
for of state owned enterprises. More attention to board
procedures, particularly related to the Board selection and
evaluation process, is essential, to produce the necessary
insulation of Boards from government interference. Ensuring
sufficient continuity of services to directors is
particularly crucial to improve corporate governance. In
addition, other factors that may reduce directors'
ability to monitor corporate activities, such as the age
profile and the number of Boards on which they sit, need to
be handled more carefully. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Vagliasindi, Maria |
author_facet |
Vagliasindi, Maria |
author_sort |
Vagliasindi, Maria |
title |
The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries |
title_short |
The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries |
title_full |
The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries |
title_fullStr |
The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries |
title_sort |
effectiveness of boards of directors of state owned enterprises in developing countries |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9292611/effectiveness-boards-directors-state-owned-enterprises-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6508 |
_version_ |
1764400428286476288 |
spelling |
okr-10986-65082021-04-23T14:02:31Z The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries Vagliasindi, Maria ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ALLEGIANCE ARTICLE OF ASSOCIATION ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AUDIT COMMITTEE AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE AUDIT COMMITTEES AUDITS AUTHORITY BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY LAW BARGAINING POWER BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARD MEMBERSHIP BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BONDS BUDGET DEFICIT BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS LAWYER CAPITAL EXPENDITURE CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS CEO CEOS CHARTERS CHIEF EXECUTIVE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS CIVIL CODE COMMON LAW COMPANIES ACT COMPANY COMPANY LAW COMPANY LAWS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE BOARD CORPORATE BOARDS CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE LAW CORPORATE LAW REFORMS CORPORATE PERFORMANCE CORPORATE SCANDALS CORPORATION CORPORATIONS COST OF CAPITAL CUSTOMER SERVICE DATA AVAILABILITY DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DELAWARE DELEGATION OF POWERS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING MARKETS DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE DISCLOSURE DIVIDEND DIVIDEND POLICY DIVIDENDS DOMESTIC COMPANIES DUTY OF CARE DUTY OF LOYALTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMERGING MARKETS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ENTERPRISE REFORM EQUITY CAPITAL EQUITY MARKET EX POST FEDERAL SECURITIES FIDUCIARY DUTY FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES FINANCIAL AUTONOMY FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL STATEMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FIRM PERFORMANCE FIRM-LEVEL GOVERNANCE FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL POLICIES FOREIGN FIRMS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES GOVERNANCE INDEXES GOVERNANCE PRACTICE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITIES GOVERNANCE SYSTEM GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET INCENTIVE COMPENSATION INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INCORPORATED INDEPENDENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INDIVIDUALS INSIDE INFORMATION INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNAL CONTROLS INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT STOCK] COMPANIES LABOR UNIONS LARGE SHAREHOLDER LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL TRANSPLANTS LEGISLATION LEGISLATURE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LIMITED LITTLE ATTENTION LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MARKET STRUCTURES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OUTPUT OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE MEASURES POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIANS PORTFOLIOS PRICE DISTORTIONS PRINCIPAL-AGENT PRIVATE ENTERPRISES PRIVATE ENTITY PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PRIVATIZATION PROXY PUBLIC CORPORATION PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS RATIONALIZATION REGULATOR REPRESENTATIVES REPUTATION REPUTATIONS REVENUE COLLECTION REVOLUTION RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS RISK MANAGEMENT SCANDAL SECURITIES LAWS SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATORS SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP SHARE PRICE SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH SHAREHOLDERS STAKEHOLDERS STATE AID STATE CORPORATE LAW STATE ENTERPRISES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK OPTIONS STOCK PRICE SUCCESSOR COMPANIES SUCCESSOR ENTITIES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAXATION TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT PROCEDURES TREASURY TURNOVER TURNOVERS UNIVERSAL ACCESS URBAN DEVELOPMENT This paper aims to shed some new light on the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of Boards of Directors of state owned enterprises with a focus on infrastructure sectors. In the case of developing countries, empirical studies have found evidence of positive links between the composition of the Board of Directors and financial performance. Yet the lack of solid theoretical foundations, and in some cases poor data availability, makes the conclusions of most studies weak. Several policy recommendations emerge from the review of the economic literature and evidence from case studies. First, the introduction of a sufficient number of independent directors emerges as an important corporate governance milestone. Empowering them to exercise effective monitoring of management, however, may prove to be a formidable challenge for of state owned enterprises. More attention to board procedures, particularly related to the Board selection and evaluation process, is essential, to produce the necessary insulation of Boards from government interference. Ensuring sufficient continuity of services to directors is particularly crucial to improve corporate governance. In addition, other factors that may reduce directors' ability to monitor corporate activities, such as the age profile and the number of Boards on which they sit, need to be handled more carefully. 2012-05-29T13:46:35Z 2012-05-29T13:46:35Z 2008-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9292611/effectiveness-boards-directors-state-owned-enterprises-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6508 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4579 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |