Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration

Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration

The availability of windfall revenues from natural resource exports or foreign aid potentially weakens governments' incentives to design efficient tax systems. Cross-country data for developing countries provide evidence for this hypothesis, u...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Knack, Stephen
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
FOREIGN AID
GOVERNANCE
REVENUE MOBILIZATION
TAX POLICY
TAX ADMINISTRATION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/11/10002285/sovereign-rents-quality-tax-policy-administration
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6353
id okr-10986-6353
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-63532021-04-23T14:02:30Z Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration Knack, Stephen FOREIGN AID GOVERNANCE REVENUE MOBILIZATION TAX POLICY TAX ADMINISTRATION The availability of windfall revenues from natural resource exports or foreign aid potentially weakens governments' incentives to design efficient tax systems. Cross-country data for developing countries provide evidence for this hypothesis, using a World Bank indicator of "efficiency of revenue mobilization." Aid's negative effects on the quality of tax systems are robust to correcting for potential reverse causality, to changes in the sample, and to alternative estimation methods. Fuel export revenues are also associated with lower-quality tax policy and administration, but this finding is somewhat sensitive to outliers. Non-fuel resource exports, in contrast, show no relationship to the efficiency of revenue mobilization. 2012-05-24T15:39:37Z 2012-05-24T15:39:37Z 2008-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/11/10002285/sovereign-rents-quality-tax-policy-administration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6353 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4773 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic FOREIGN AID
GOVERNANCE
REVENUE MOBILIZATION
TAX POLICY
TAX ADMINISTRATION
spellingShingle FOREIGN AID
GOVERNANCE
REVENUE MOBILIZATION
TAX POLICY
TAX ADMINISTRATION
Knack, Stephen
Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4773
description The availability of windfall revenues from natural resource exports or foreign aid potentially weakens governments' incentives to design efficient tax systems. Cross-country data for developing countries provide evidence for this hypothesis, using a World Bank indicator of "efficiency of revenue mobilization." Aid's negative effects on the quality of tax systems are robust to correcting for potential reverse causality, to changes in the sample, and to alternative estimation methods. Fuel export revenues are also associated with lower-quality tax policy and administration, but this finding is somewhat sensitive to outliers. Non-fuel resource exports, in contrast, show no relationship to the efficiency of revenue mobilization.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Knack, Stephen
author_facet Knack, Stephen
author_sort Knack, Stephen
title Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration
title_short Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration
title_full Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration
title_fullStr Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration
title_full_unstemmed Sovereign Rents and the Quality of Tax Policy and Administration
title_sort sovereign rents and the quality of tax policy and administration
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/11/10002285/sovereign-rents-quality-tax-policy-administration
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6353
_version_ 1764399938258599936

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