Sticks and Carrots: Two Incentive Mechanisms Supporting Intra-group Cooperation
In this note, we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra-group cooperation in the context of prisoner's dilemma payoffs: rewards for cooperating, and punishments for defection, where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship.
Main Authors: | Janus, Thorsten, Lim, Jamus Jerome |
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Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | EN |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5880 |
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