Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence

We attempt to improve the understanding and measurement of decentralization and its relationship with corruption in a worldwide context. This is done by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such a relationship as well as using more defensible measures of both decentralization in its various di...

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Main Authors:	Ivanyna, Maksym, Shah, Anwar
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5874

id	okr-10986-5874
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-58742021-04-23T14:02:23Z Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence Ivanyna, Maksym Shah, Anwar Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770 We attempt to improve the understanding and measurement of decentralization and its relationship with corruption in a worldwide context. This is done by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such a relationship as well as using more defensible measures of both decentralization in its various dimensions as well as corruption for a sample of 158 countries. It is the first paper that treats various tiers of local governments (below the intermediate order of government) as the unit of comparative analysis. By pursuing rigorous econometric analysis we demonstrate that decentralization, when properly measured to mean moving government closer to people by empowering local governments, is shown to have a significant negative effect on the incidence of corruption regardless of the choice of the estimation procedures or the measures of corruption used. In terms of various dimensions of decentralized local governance, political decentralization matters even when we control for fiscal decentralization. Further voice (political accountability) is empirically shown to be more important in combating corruption than exit options made available though competition among jurisdictions. 2012-03-30T07:34:58Z 2012-03-30T07:34:58Z 2011 Journal Article Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 0263774X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5874 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770
spellingShingle	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770 Ivanyna, Maksym Shah, Anwar Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	We attempt to improve the understanding and measurement of decentralization and its relationship with corruption in a worldwide context. This is done by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such a relationship as well as using more defensible measures of both decentralization in its various dimensions as well as corruption for a sample of 158 countries. It is the first paper that treats various tiers of local governments (below the intermediate order of government) as the unit of comparative analysis. By pursuing rigorous econometric analysis we demonstrate that decentralization, when properly measured to mean moving government closer to people by empowering local governments, is shown to have a significant negative effect on the incidence of corruption regardless of the choice of the estimation procedures or the measures of corruption used. In terms of various dimensions of decentralized local governance, political decentralization matters even when we control for fiscal decentralization. Further voice (political accountability) is empirically shown to be more important in combating corruption than exit options made available though competition among jurisdictions.
format	Journal Article
author	Ivanyna, Maksym Shah, Anwar
author_facet	Ivanyna, Maksym Shah, Anwar
author_sort	Ivanyna, Maksym
title	Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence
title_short	Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence
title_full	Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence
title_fullStr	Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence
title_full_unstemmed	Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence
title_sort	decentralization and corruption : new cross-country evidence
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5874
_version_	1764396619891998720

Decentralization and Corruption : New Cross-country Evidence

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