The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999

This paper examines the impact of the political party structure on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. By analysing inter-provincial variations in the quality of service delivery in Pakistan, the paper argues that the more fragmented...

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Main Author:	Hasnain, Zahid
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5822

id	okr-10986-5822
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-58222021-04-23T14:02:23Z The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999 Hasnain, Zahid Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 This paper examines the impact of the political party structure on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. By analysing inter-provincial variations in the quality of service delivery in Pakistan, the paper argues that the more fragmented, factionalised, and polarised the party systems, the greater are the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Fragmentation and factionalism both exacerbate the information problems that voters have in assigning credit (blame) for service delivery improvements (deterioration), thereby creating the incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits. Polarisation, particularly ethnic polarisation, reduces the ability of groups to agree on the provision of public goods, again causing politicians to favour the delivery of targeted benefits. 2012-03-30T07:34:43Z 2012-03-30T07:34:43Z 2008 Journal Article Pakistan Development Review 00309729 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5822 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Pakistan
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
spellingShingle	Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Hasnain, Zahid The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
geographic_facet	Pakistan
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	This paper examines the impact of the political party structure on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. By analysing inter-provincial variations in the quality of service delivery in Pakistan, the paper argues that the more fragmented, factionalised, and polarised the party systems, the greater are the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Fragmentation and factionalism both exacerbate the information problems that voters have in assigning credit (blame) for service delivery improvements (deterioration), thereby creating the incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits. Polarisation, particularly ethnic polarisation, reduces the ability of groups to agree on the provision of public goods, again causing politicians to favour the delivery of targeted benefits.
format	Journal Article
author	Hasnain, Zahid
author_facet	Hasnain, Zahid
author_sort	Hasnain, Zahid
title	The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
title_short	The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
title_full	The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
title_fullStr	The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
title_full_unstemmed	The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999
title_sort	politics of service delivery in pakistan: political parties and the incentives for patronage, 1988-1999
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5822
_version_	1764396440062263296

The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999

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