Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America

Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the eff...

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Main Authors:	Guasch, J. Luis, Straub, Stephane
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920 Gas Utilities Pipelines Water Utilities L950 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5804

id	okr-10986-5804
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-58042021-04-23T14:02:23Z Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America Guasch, J. Luis Straub, Stephane Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920 Gas Utilities Pipelines Water Utilities L950 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions. 2012-03-30T07:34:37Z 2012-03-30T07:34:37Z 2009 Journal Article Utilities Policy 09571787 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5804 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Latin America & Caribbean
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920 Gas Utilities Pipelines Water Utilities L950 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180
spellingShingle	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920 Gas Utilities Pipelines Water Utilities L950 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Guasch, J. Luis Straub, Stephane Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions.
format	Journal Article
author	Guasch, J. Luis Straub, Stephane
author_facet	Guasch, J. Luis Straub, Stephane
author_sort	Guasch, J. Luis
title	Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
title_short	Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
title_full	Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
title_fullStr	Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
title_full_unstemmed	Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
title_sort	corruption and concession renegotiations : evidence from the water and transport sectors in latin america
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5804
_version_	1764396360111489024

Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America

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