Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects

To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to ent...

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Main Authors:	Estache, Antonio, Iimi, Atsushi
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Auctions D440 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H570 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning R420 Public Facility Location Analysis Public Investment and Capital Stock R530
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5699

id	okr-10986-5699
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-56992021-04-23T14:02:23Z Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi Auctions D440 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H570 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning R420 Public Facility Location Analysis Public Investment and Capital Stock R530 To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices. 2012-03-30T07:34:06Z 2012-03-30T07:34:06Z 2009 Journal Article Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 13704788 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5699 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Auctions D440 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H570 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning R420 Public Facility Location Analysis Public Investment and Capital Stock R530
spellingShingle	Auctions D440 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H570 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning R420 Public Facility Location Analysis Public Investment and Capital Stock R530 Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices.
format	Journal Article
author	Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi
author_facet	Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi
author_sort	Estache, Antonio
title	Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects
title_short	Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects
title_full	Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects
title_fullStr	Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects
title_full_unstemmed	Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects
title_sort	joint bidding, governance and public procurement costs : a case of road projects
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5699
_version_	1764395999796658176

Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs : A Case of Road Projects

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