A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
We propose a simple theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution and then analyze under what conditions delegation is optimal for society. Our theory builds on Holmstrom's (1982, 1999) "hidden effort&...
Main Authors: | Eggertsson, Gauti B., Le Borgne, Eric |
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Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | EN |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5680 |
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