Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions

This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer...

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Main Authors: Do, Quy-Toan, Levchenko, Andrei A.
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5668
id okr-10986-5668
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-56682021-04-23T14:02:23Z Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions Do, Quy-Toan Levchenko, Andrei A. Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations D020 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Neoclassical Models of Trade F110 Trade Policy International Trade Organizations F130 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size Distribution of Firms L110 This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenously determined in a political economy equilibrium. Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when it changes the political power in favor of a small elite of large exporters, who in turn prefer to install high entry barriers. 2012-03-30T07:33:57Z 2012-03-30T07:33:57Z 2009 Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory 00220531 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5668 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language EN
topic Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations D020
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720
Neoclassical Models of Trade F110
Trade Policy
International Trade Organizations F130
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure
Size Distribution of Firms L110
spellingShingle Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations D020
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720
Neoclassical Models of Trade F110
Trade Policy
International Trade Organizations F130
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure
Size Distribution of Firms L110
Do, Quy-Toan
Levchenko, Andrei A.
Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions
relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenously determined in a political economy equilibrium. Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when it changes the political power in favor of a small elite of large exporters, who in turn prefer to install high entry barriers.
format Journal Article
author Do, Quy-Toan
Levchenko, Andrei A.
author_facet Do, Quy-Toan
Levchenko, Andrei A.
author_sort Do, Quy-Toan
title Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions
title_short Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions
title_full Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions
title_fullStr Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions
title_full_unstemmed Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions
title_sort trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5668
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