Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse

A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of po...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bulte, Erwin, Damania, Richard
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5473

id	okr-10986-5473
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-54732021-04-23T14:02:22Z Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse Bulte, Erwin Damania, Richard Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the 'resource curse.' These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path. 2012-03-30T07:33:00Z 2012-03-30T07:33:00Z 2008 Journal Article B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 19351682 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5473 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
spellingShingle	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Bulte, Erwin Damania, Richard Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the 'resource curse.' These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path.
format	Journal Article
author	Bulte, Erwin Damania, Richard
author_facet	Bulte, Erwin Damania, Richard
author_sort	Bulte, Erwin
title	Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
title_short	Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
title_full	Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
title_fullStr	Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
title_full_unstemmed	Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
title_sort	resources for sale: corruption, democracy and the natural resource curse
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5473
_version_	1764395178129358848

Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse

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