Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis

To improve our understanding of corruption in service delivery, we use a newly designed game that allows us to investigate the effects of the institutional environment on the behavior of service providers and their monitors. We focus on the effect of four different factors: whether monitors are acco...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Barr, Abigail, Lindelow, Magnus, Serneels, Pieter
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5044

id	okr-10986-5044
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-50442021-04-23T14:02:20Z Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis Barr, Abigail Lindelow, Magnus Serneels, Pieter Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 To improve our understanding of corruption in service delivery, we use a newly designed game that allows us to investigate the effects of the institutional environment on the behavior of service providers and their monitors. We focus on the effect of four different factors: whether monitors are accountable to the service recipients, the degree of observability of service providers' effort, the providers' wages and the providers' professional norms. In accordance with theory, we find that service providers perform better when monitors are elected by service recipients and when their effort is more easily observed. However, there is only weak evidence that service providers perform better when paid more. Monitors are more vigilant when elected and when service providers are paid more. Playing the game with Ethiopian nursing students, we also find that those with greater exposure to the Ethiopian public health sector perform less well, either as provider or as monitor, when the experiment is framed as a public health provision scenario, suggesting that experience and norms affect behavior. 2012-03-30T07:31:00Z 2012-03-30T07:31:00Z 2009 Journal Article Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 01672681 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5044 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Ethiopia
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
spellingShingle	Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption D730 Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Barr, Abigail Lindelow, Magnus Serneels, Pieter Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis
geographic_facet	Ethiopia
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	To improve our understanding of corruption in service delivery, we use a newly designed game that allows us to investigate the effects of the institutional environment on the behavior of service providers and their monitors. We focus on the effect of four different factors: whether monitors are accountable to the service recipients, the degree of observability of service providers' effort, the providers' wages and the providers' professional norms. In accordance with theory, we find that service providers perform better when monitors are elected by service recipients and when their effort is more easily observed. However, there is only weak evidence that service providers perform better when paid more. Monitors are more vigilant when elected and when service providers are paid more. Playing the game with Ethiopian nursing students, we also find that those with greater exposure to the Ethiopian public health sector perform less well, either as provider or as monitor, when the experiment is framed as a public health provision scenario, suggesting that experience and norms affect behavior.
format	Journal Article
author	Barr, Abigail Lindelow, Magnus Serneels, Pieter
author_facet	Barr, Abigail Lindelow, Magnus Serneels, Pieter
author_sort	Barr, Abigail
title	Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis
title_short	Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis
title_full	Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis
title_fullStr	Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis
title_full_unstemmed	Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis
title_sort	corruption in public service delivery : an experimental analysis
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5044
_version_	1764393717850963968

Corruption in Public Service Delivery : An Experimental Analysis

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