An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution decisions. The decision-making process has been approximated by two different discrete choice...

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Main Authors:	Avalos, Marcos, De Hoyos, Rafael E.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Mergers Acquisitions Restructuring Voting Proxy Contests Corporate Governance G340 Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G380 Antitrust Law K210 Monopolization Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L410 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4798

id	okr-10986-4798
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-47982021-04-23T14:02:19Z An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. Mergers Acquisitions Restructuring Voting Proxy Contests Corporate Governance G340 Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G380 Antitrust Law K210 Monopolization Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L410 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution decisions. The decision-making process has been approximated by two different discrete choice models. Our results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being challenged. We also find that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect upon the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger. 2012-03-30T07:29:47Z 2012-03-30T07:29:47Z 2008 Journal Article Review of Industrial Organization 0889938X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4798 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Mexico
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Mergers Acquisitions Restructuring Voting Proxy Contests Corporate Governance G340 Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G380 Antitrust Law K210 Monopolization Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L410 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170
spellingShingle	Mergers Acquisitions Restructuring Voting Proxy Contests Corporate Governance G340 Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G380 Antitrust Law K210 Monopolization Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L410 Formal and Informal Sectors Shadow Economy Institutional Arrangements O170 Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E. An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
geographic_facet	Mexico
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution decisions. The decision-making process has been approximated by two different discrete choice models. Our results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being challenged. We also find that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect upon the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.
format	Journal Article
author	Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E.
author_facet	Avalos, Marcos De Hoyos, Rafael E.
author_sort	Avalos, Marcos
title	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_short	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_full	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_fullStr	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_full_unstemmed	An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy
title_sort	empirical analysis of mexican merger policy
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4798
_version_	1764392801150173184

An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

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