Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition

We develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. We find that in the postcommunist countries, more frequent changes in power in the early years of transition are as...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Milanovic, Branko, Hoff, Karla, Horowitz, Shale
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4775

id	okr-10986-4775
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-47752021-04-23T14:02:19Z Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260 We develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. We find that in the postcommunist countries, more frequent changes in power in the early years of transition are associated with better governance in the later years. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that more frequent turnover in power lowers the returns to firms seeking to buy political influence: i.e,. that government turnover serves as a restraint on investing in influence regardless of the ideology of the government. 2012-03-30T07:29:41Z 2012-03-30T07:29:41Z 2010 Journal Article Economics and Politics 09541985 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4775 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260
spellingShingle	Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260 Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	We develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. We find that in the postcommunist countries, more frequent changes in power in the early years of transition are associated with better governance in the later years. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that more frequent turnover in power lowers the returns to firms seeking to buy political influence: i.e,. that government turnover serves as a restraint on investing in influence regardless of the ideology of the government.
format	Journal Article
author	Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale
author_facet	Milanovic, Branko Hoff, Karla Horowitz, Shale
author_sort	Milanovic, Branko
title	Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition
title_short	Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition
title_full	Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition
title_fullStr	Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition
title_full_unstemmed	Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition
title_sort	turnover in power as a restraint on investing in influence: evidence from the postcommunist transition
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4775
_version_	1764392714734927872

Turnover in Power as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Postcommunist Transition

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