Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?

In this paper, we use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to empirically estimate the distribution of the burden induced by the military draft. We focus on draft avoidance as a common response to the conscription system ridden by corruption. We develop a simple theoretical m...

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Main Authors:	Lokshin, Michael, Yemtsov, Ruslan
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	National Security and War H560 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty I320 Public Sector Labor Markets J450 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics Health Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty P360
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4728

id	okr-10986-4728
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-47282021-04-23T14:02:19Z Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft? Lokshin, Michael Yemtsov, Ruslan National Security and War H560 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty I320 Public Sector Labor Markets J450 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics Health Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty P360 In this paper, we use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to empirically estimate the distribution of the burden induced by the military draft. We focus on draft avoidance as a common response to the conscription system ridden by corruption. We develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment as a function of its pre-draft welfare. We employ the full information maximum-likelihood instrumental variable model to estimate the effect of household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army. Our results indicate that the burden of conscription falls excessively on the poor. Poor, low-educated, rural households are much more likely to have their sons enlisted compared to urban, wealthy and better-educated families. Using the predicted probability of draft avoidance, we estimate the short-term direct economic cost of the draft as lost wages of serving conscripts. Our results suggest that losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes. 2012-03-30T07:29:26Z 2012-03-30T07:29:26Z 2008 Journal Article Economics of Transition 09670750 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4728 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Russian Federation
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	National Security and War H560 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty I320 Public Sector Labor Markets J450 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics Health Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty P360
spellingShingle	National Security and War H560 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty I320 Public Sector Labor Markets J450 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy Property Rights P260 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics Health Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty P360 Lokshin, Michael Yemtsov, Ruslan Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?
geographic_facet	Russian Federation
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	In this paper, we use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to empirically estimate the distribution of the burden induced by the military draft. We focus on draft avoidance as a common response to the conscription system ridden by corruption. We develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment as a function of its pre-draft welfare. We employ the full information maximum-likelihood instrumental variable model to estimate the effect of household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army. Our results indicate that the burden of conscription falls excessively on the poor. Poor, low-educated, rural households are much more likely to have their sons enlisted compared to urban, wealthy and better-educated families. Using the predicted probability of draft avoidance, we estimate the short-term direct economic cost of the draft as lost wages of serving conscripts. Our results suggest that losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.
format	Journal Article
author	Lokshin, Michael Yemtsov, Ruslan
author_facet	Lokshin, Michael Yemtsov, Ruslan
author_sort	Lokshin, Michael
title	Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?
title_short	Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?
title_full	Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?
title_fullStr	Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?
title_full_unstemmed	Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?
title_sort	who bears the cost of russia's military draft?
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4728
_version_	1764392530998198272

Who Bears the Cost of Russia's Military Draft?

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