Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention

Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second,...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Keefer, Philip, Neumayer, Eric, Plumper, Thomas
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610
id okr-10986-4610
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-46102021-04-23T14:02:18Z Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas Health Production I120 Economics of Regulation L510 Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780 Climate Natural Disasters Global Warming Q540 Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries. 2012-03-30T07:28:47Z 2012-03-30T07:28:47Z 2011 Journal Article World Development 0305750X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language EN
topic Health Production I120
Economics of Regulation L510
Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780
Climate
Natural Disasters
Global Warming Q540
spellingShingle Health Production I120
Economics of Regulation L510
Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780
Climate
Natural Disasters
Global Warming Q540
Keefer, Philip
Neumayer, Eric
Plumper, Thomas
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries.
format Journal Article
author Keefer, Philip
Neumayer, Eric
Plumper, Thomas
author_facet Keefer, Philip
Neumayer, Eric
Plumper, Thomas
author_sort Keefer, Philip
title Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
title_short Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
title_full Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
title_fullStr Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
title_full_unstemmed Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
title_sort earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610
_version_ 1764392109722304512