Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second,...
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okr-10986-46102021-04-23T14:02:18Z Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas Health Production I120 Economics of Regulation L510 Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780 Climate Natural Disasters Global Warming Q540 Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries. 2012-03-30T07:28:47Z 2012-03-30T07:28:47Z 2011 Journal Article World Development 0305750X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
EN |
topic |
Health Production I120 Economics of Regulation L510 Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780 Climate Natural Disasters Global Warming Q540 |
spellingShingle |
Health Production I120 Economics of Regulation L510 Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780 Climate Natural Disasters Global Warming Q540 Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
relation |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo |
description |
Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas |
author_facet |
Keefer, Philip Neumayer, Eric Plumper, Thomas |
author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
title |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
title_short |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
title_full |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
title_fullStr |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
title_full_unstemmed |
Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention |
title_sort |
earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610 |
_version_ |
1764392109722304512 |