Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis
The relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation has recently assumed greater prominence in the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor linking political and r...
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World Bank
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4512 |
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okr-10986-45122021-04-23T14:02:18Z Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis Gasmi, Farid Um, Paul Noumba Virto, Laura Recuero administrative procedures allocative efficiency comparative analysis conceptual framework developed countries econometrics economic development economic growth economic incentives empirical analysis empirical evidence empirical studies environments market economies political accountability political economy production functions social participation streams sustainable development The relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation has recently assumed greater prominence in the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor linking political and regulatory structures and processes, this article empirically investigates its impact on the performance of regulation in telecommunications in time-series–cross-sectional data sets for 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries during 1985–99. In addition to confirming some well-documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the article provides empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis finds that the impact of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems. 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2009-11-30 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4512 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Marshall Islands Brazil Chile Argentina |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| topic |
administrative procedures allocative efficiency comparative analysis conceptual framework developed countries econometrics economic development economic growth economic incentives empirical analysis empirical evidence empirical studies environments market economies political accountability political economy production functions social participation streams sustainable development |
| spellingShingle |
administrative procedures allocative efficiency comparative analysis conceptual framework developed countries econometrics economic development economic growth economic incentives empirical analysis empirical evidence empirical studies environments market economies political accountability political economy production functions social participation streams sustainable development Gasmi, Farid Um, Paul Noumba Virto, Laura Recuero Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis |
| geographic_facet |
Marshall Islands Brazil Chile Argentina |
| description |
The relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation has recently assumed greater prominence in the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor linking political and regulatory structures and processes, this article empirically investigates its impact on the performance of regulation in telecommunications in time-series–cross-sectional data sets for 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries during 1985–99. In addition to confirming some well-documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the article provides empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis finds that the impact of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems. |
| format |
Journal Article |
| author |
Gasmi, Farid Um, Paul Noumba Virto, Laura Recuero |
| author_facet |
Gasmi, Farid Um, Paul Noumba Virto, Laura Recuero |
| author_sort |
Gasmi, Farid |
| title |
Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_short |
Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_full |
Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_fullStr |
Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Accountability and Regulatory Performance in Infrastructure Industries : An Empirical Analysis |
| title_sort |
political accountability and regulatory performance in infrastructure industries : an empirical analysis |
| publisher |
World Bank |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4512 |
| _version_ |
1764391688765177856 |