From Government to Regulatory Governance

This article reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and control. Optimal governance systems depend on the path of institutional development. Nevertheless, the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the private sector often yields a desirable gove...

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Main Authors:	Bortolotti, Bernardo, Perotti, Enrico
Format:	Journal Article
Published:	World Bank 2012
Subjects:	accountability citizens constituencies degree of autonomy disclosure financial crises financial institutions institutional development nationalization political power politicians public control public subsidies representatives social control social equity state enterprises state ownership state planning state-owned enterprises
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4404

id	okr-10986-4404
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-44042021-04-23T14:02:17Z From Government to Regulatory Governance Bortolotti, Bernardo Perotti, Enrico accountability citizens constituencies degree of autonomy disclosure financial crises financial institutions institutional development nationalization political power politicians public control public subsidies representatives social control social equity state enterprises state ownership state planning state-owned enterprises This article reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and control. Optimal governance systems depend on the path of institutional development. Nevertheless, the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the private sector often yields a desirable governance system, because it may be more difficult for citizens to constrain political abuse than for governments to regulate private activity. In weak institutional environments, however, the process needs to be structured to avoid capture of the regulatory process. The speed of transfer should be matched to progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. After all, “institutions” are simply governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests. The gradual creation of institutions partially shielded from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The article presents suggestions for establishing accountability in regulatory governance, in particular by creating an internal control system based on a rotating board with representatives of users, producers, and civil society, in a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure. 2012-03-30T07:12:32Z 2012-03-30T07:12:32Z 2007-03-01 Journal Article World Bank Research Observer 1564-6971 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4404 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank Journal Article Russian Federation
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
topic	accountability citizens constituencies degree of autonomy disclosure financial crises financial institutions institutional development nationalization political power politicians public control public subsidies representatives social control social equity state enterprises state ownership state planning state-owned enterprises
spellingShingle	accountability citizens constituencies degree of autonomy disclosure financial crises financial institutions institutional development nationalization political power politicians public control public subsidies representatives social control social equity state enterprises state ownership state planning state-owned enterprises Bortolotti, Bernardo Perotti, Enrico From Government to Regulatory Governance
geographic_facet	Russian Federation
description	This article reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and control. Optimal governance systems depend on the path of institutional development. Nevertheless, the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the private sector often yields a desirable governance system, because it may be more difficult for citizens to constrain political abuse than for governments to regulate private activity. In weak institutional environments, however, the process needs to be structured to avoid capture of the regulatory process. The speed of transfer should be matched to progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. After all, “institutions” are simply governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests. The gradual creation of institutions partially shielded from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The article presents suggestions for establishing accountability in regulatory governance, in particular by creating an internal control system based on a rotating board with representatives of users, producers, and civil society, in a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure.
format	Journal Article
author	Bortolotti, Bernardo Perotti, Enrico
author_facet	Bortolotti, Bernardo Perotti, Enrico
author_sort	Bortolotti, Bernardo
title	From Government to Regulatory Governance
title_short	From Government to Regulatory Governance
title_full	From Government to Regulatory Governance
title_fullStr	From Government to Regulatory Governance
title_full_unstemmed	From Government to Regulatory Governance
title_sort	from government to regulatory governance
publisher	World Bank
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4404
_version_	1764391214285586432

From Government to Regulatory Governance

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