When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, the...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123 |
| Summary: | The authors examine a unique public
spending program that is proliferating across developing
countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate
when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their
constituents. Using data from India, they find that
legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies
where voters are more attached to political parties. They
are also lower in constituencies that are reserved for
members of socially disadvantaged groups (lower castes),
specifically in those reserved constituencies that are
candidate strongholds. This result is robust to controls for
alternate explanations and implies that legislators pass on
pork when voters are more attached to political parties or
influenced by identity issues. These findings have
implications for the evaluation of constituency development
funds. They also provide a new answer to a central issue in
political economy, the conditions under which legislators
seek to "bring home the pork" to constituents,
that attaches great importance to the role of political parties. |
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