Exit and Save : Migration and Saving under Violence

This paper examines how households trade off migration and savings when subject to exogenous violence. The authors propose that households under violence decide jointly on migration and saving, because a higher asset-stock is more difficult to carr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Grun, Rebekka E.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	2012
Subjects:	ACCESS TO SERVICES ACCESSIBILITY ACCOUNTING AGRICULTURE ASSET OWNERSHIP ASSET PRICING BANK BANK ASSETS BANK CREDIT BANK DEPOSITS BANKS BENEFICIARIES BIAS BORROWING CALCULATIONS CAPITAL CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL INVESTMENT CHILD LABOUR CHILDREN CONSUMER CONSUMPTION CORPORATE FINANCE COST ESTIMATE CREDIT CREDIT SCORING DECISION MAKING DELINQUENCY DEPOSIT DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICIES ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC SURVEYS EDUCATION EDUCATION LEVEL EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION EMPLOYER EMPLOYMENT STATUS ENTERPRISE ENTERPRISES EQUITY EXCLUSION EXPECTED VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE EXTORTION FAMILIES FAMILY FAMILY MEMBERS FAMILY STRUCTURE FAMILY WELFARE FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS FINANCE FINANCIAL REGULATION FIXED ASSETS FORCED MIGRATION FUTURE INCOME GANGS GENDER HOUSEHOLD HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SAVING HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN RIGHTS ID INCENTIVES INCOME MEASURES INCREASING RETURNS INDIRECT COST INEQUALITY INFLUENCE INFORMATION INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INSURANCE INTEREST INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT DECISIONS INVESTMENTS JOB SEARCH JOB TRAINING KNOWLEDGE LIFETIME LIFETIMES MARITAL STATUS MARRIAGE MEASUREMENT MIGRANT WORKERS MONEY MONTHLY INCOME NATURAL RESOURCES OTHER ASSETS OUTCOMES PENSION REFORMS PEOPLE PERSECUTION PHYSICAL VIOLENCE POLITICAL ECONOMY POPULATION PRECAUTIONARY SAVINGS PRIMARY EDUCATION PROBABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC PENSION QUESTIONNAIRE REAL COST REAL ESTATE REFUGEE REFUGEES RELIGIOUS GROUPS REVENUE RISK AVERSE RISK OF VIOLENCE RISK PERCEPTION SALARY SAVING SAVING BEHAVIOR SAVINGS SAVINGS BEHAVIOR SAVINGS BEHAVIOUR SAVINGS RATE SAVINGS RATES SOCIAL CAPITAL SOURCE OF INCOME STATE UNIVERSITY STOCKS TAXATION THEORY TRADE TRANSACTIONS UTILITY VALUE VARIABLES VILLAGE VIOLENCE WAGE WEALTH WELFARE WELFARE SYSTEM WOMEN WORKSHOP WORTH
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090429090453 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4109

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Summary:	This paper examines how households trade off migration and savings when subject to exogenous violence. The authors propose that households under violence decide jointly on migration and saving, because a higher asset-stock is more difficult to carry to a new place. When confronted with exogenous violence, households are expected to consider migration, and reduce their assets, both in order to reduce their exposure to violence, and to make migration easier. In some cases, after a migration decision has been taken, savings can increase as a function of violence to ensure a minimum bundle to carry. Empirical evidence from rich Colombian micro-data supports the conceptual framework for violence that carries a displacement threat, such as guerrilla attacks.

Exit and Save : Migration and Saving under Violence

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