Banking on Politics
This paper presents new data from 150 countries showing that former cabinet members, central bank governors, and financial regulators are many orders of magnitude more likely than other citizens to become board members of banks. Countries where the...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090415165247 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4096 |
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okr-10986-40962021-04-23T14:02:15Z Banking on Politics Raddatz, Claudio Braun, Matías ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING PRACTICES BALANCE-SHEET BANK CREDIT BANKING CRISIS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SECTOR BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BRIBES CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CENTRAL BANKING CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION CREDITOR CREDITORS DEBT EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL DATA FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL EXPERTISE FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL REGULATION FINANCIAL REGULATOR FINANCIAL REGULATORS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FIRM PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCOME INDIVIDUALS INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES LEGAL PROTECTION LENDERS LIMITED LIQUID ASSETS MACROECONOMICS MINISTERS MISREPORTING POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PRIVATE BANKING PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE CREDIT PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PROFITABILITY PROXY PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC SERVICES RELEVANT POPULATION RENTS RETURN ON ASSETS RETURN ON EQUITY SALARIES SECURITIES SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIETY This paper presents new data from 150 countries showing that former cabinet members, central bank governors, and financial regulators are many orders of magnitude more likely than other citizens to become board members of banks. Countries where the politician-banker phenomenon is more prevalent have higher corruption and more powerful yet less accountable governments, but not better functioning financial systems. Regulation becomes more pro-banker where this happens more often. Furthermore, a higher fraction of the rents that are created accrue to bankers, former politicians are not more likely to be directors when their side is in power, and banks are more profitable without being more leveraged. Rather than supporting a public interest view, the evidence is consistent with a capture-type private interest story where, in exchange for a non-executive position at a bank in the future, politicians provide for beneficial regulation. 2012-03-19T19:09:55Z 2012-03-19T19:09:55Z 2009-04-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090415165247 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4096 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4902 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING PRACTICES BALANCE-SHEET BANK CREDIT BANKING CRISIS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SECTOR BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BRIBES CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CENTRAL BANKING CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION CREDITOR CREDITORS DEBT EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL DATA FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL EXPERTISE FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL REGULATION FINANCIAL REGULATOR FINANCIAL REGULATORS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FIRM PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCOME INDIVIDUALS INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES LEGAL PROTECTION LENDERS LIMITED LIQUID ASSETS MACROECONOMICS MINISTERS MISREPORTING POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PRIVATE BANKING PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE CREDIT PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PROFITABILITY PROXY PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC SERVICES RELEVANT POPULATION RENTS RETURN ON ASSETS RETURN ON EQUITY SALARIES SECURITIES SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIETY |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTING PRACTICES BALANCE-SHEET BANK CREDIT BANKING CRISIS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SECTOR BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOARD MEMBER BOARD MEMBERS BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BRIBES CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS CENTRAL BANKING CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT CORRUPTION CREDITOR CREDITORS DEBT EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL DATA FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL EXPERTISE FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL RATIOS FINANCIAL REGULATION FINANCIAL REGULATOR FINANCIAL REGULATORS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FIRM PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCOME INDIVIDUALS INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES LEGAL PROTECTION LENDERS LIMITED LIQUID ASSETS MACROECONOMICS MINISTERS MISREPORTING POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PRIVATE BANKING PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATE CREDIT PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PROFITABILITY PROXY PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC SERVICES RELEVANT POPULATION RENTS RETURN ON ASSETS RETURN ON EQUITY SALARIES SECURITIES SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL NETWORKS SOCIETY Raddatz, Claudio Braun, Matías Banking on Politics |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4902 |
| description |
This paper presents new data from 150
countries showing that former cabinet members, central bank
governors, and financial regulators are many orders of
magnitude more likely than other citizens to become board
members of banks. Countries where the politician-banker
phenomenon is more prevalent have higher corruption and more
powerful yet less accountable governments, but not better
functioning financial systems. Regulation becomes more
pro-banker where this happens more often. Furthermore, a
higher fraction of the rents that are created accrue to
bankers, former politicians are not more likely to be
directors when their side is in power, and banks are more
profitable without being more leveraged. Rather than
supporting a public interest view, the evidence is
consistent with a capture-type private interest story where,
in exchange for a non-executive position at a bank in the
future, politicians provide for beneficial regulation. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Raddatz, Claudio Braun, Matías |
| author_facet |
Raddatz, Claudio Braun, Matías |
| author_sort |
Raddatz, Claudio |
| title |
Banking on Politics |
| title_short |
Banking on Politics |
| title_full |
Banking on Politics |
| title_fullStr |
Banking on Politics |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Banking on Politics |
| title_sort |
banking on politics |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090415165247 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4096 |
| _version_ |
1764389900980846592 |