Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence

This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power...

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Main Authors:	Bruhn, Miriam, Gallego, Francisco, Onorato, Massimiliano
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	2012
Subjects:	ALLOCATION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BICAMERAL SYSTEM BOND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY RISK COUNTRY TO COUNTRY DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIC STATE DEMOGRAPHIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES DICTATORSHIP ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT GDP GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCIES INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGITIMACY LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE LOWER HOUSES MACROECONOMICS MOTIVATION OUTPUT PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PEACE PLEBISCITE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC POLICIES RENTS REPRESENTATIVES REPUBLIC RIGHT TO VOTE VOTING WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD ECONOMIES WORLD ECONOMY
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101102132755 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3948

id	okr-10986-3948
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spelling	okr-10986-39482021-04-23T14:02:14Z Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence Bruhn, Miriam Gallego, Francisco Onorato, Massimiliano ALLOCATION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BICAMERAL SYSTEM BOND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY RISK COUNTRY TO COUNTRY DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIC STATE DEMOGRAPHIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES DICTATORSHIP ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT GDP GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCIES INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGITIMACY LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE LOWER HOUSES MACROECONOMICS MOTIVATION OUTPUT PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PEACE PLEBISCITE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC POLICIES RENTS REPRESENTATIVES REPUBLIC RIGHT TO VOTE VOTING WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD ECONOMIES WORLD ECONOMY This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power and economic interests after a transition to democracy. The authors claim that legislative malapportionment enhances the pre-democratic elite s political influence by over-representing areas that are more likely to vote for parties aligned with the elite. This biased political representation survives in equilibrium as long as it helps democratic consolidation. Using data from Latin America, the authors document empirically that malapportionment increases the probability of transitioning to a democracy. Moreover, the data show that over-represented electoral districts are more likely to vote for parties close to pre-democracy ruling groups. The analysis also finds that overrepresented areas have lower levels of political competition and receive more transfers per capita from the central government, both of which favor the persistence of power of pre-democracy elites. 2012-03-19T18:42:41Z 2012-03-19T18:42:41Z 2010-11-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101102132755 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3948 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5467 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean The World Region The World Region
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ALLOCATION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BICAMERAL SYSTEM BOND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY RISK COUNTRY TO COUNTRY DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIC STATE DEMOGRAPHIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES DICTATORSHIP ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT GDP GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCIES INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGITIMACY LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE LOWER HOUSES MACROECONOMICS MOTIVATION OUTPUT PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PEACE PLEBISCITE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC POLICIES RENTS REPRESENTATIVES REPUBLIC RIGHT TO VOTE VOTING WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD ECONOMIES WORLD ECONOMY
spellingShingle	ALLOCATION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BICAMERAL SYSTEM BOND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS COUNTRY RISK COUNTRY TO COUNTRY DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIC STATE DEMOGRAPHIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES DICTATORSHIP ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEM ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT GDP GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCIES INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGITIMACY LOBBYING LOWER HOUSE LOWER HOUSES MACROECONOMICS MOTIVATION OUTPUT PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PATRONAGE PEACE PLEBISCITE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC POLICIES RENTS REPRESENTATIVES REPUBLIC RIGHT TO VOTE VOTING WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD ECONOMIES WORLD ECONOMY Bruhn, Miriam Gallego, Francisco Onorato, Massimiliano Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean The World Region The World Region
relation	Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5467
description	This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power and economic interests after a transition to democracy. The authors claim that legislative malapportionment enhances the pre-democratic elite s political influence by over-representing areas that are more likely to vote for parties aligned with the elite. This biased political representation survives in equilibrium as long as it helps democratic consolidation. Using data from Latin America, the authors document empirically that malapportionment increases the probability of transitioning to a democracy. Moreover, the data show that over-represented electoral districts are more likely to vote for parties close to pre-democracy ruling groups. The analysis also finds that overrepresented areas have lower levels of political competition and receive more transfers per capita from the central government, both of which favor the persistence of power of pre-democracy elites.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Bruhn, Miriam Gallego, Francisco Onorato, Massimiliano
author_facet	Bruhn, Miriam Gallego, Francisco Onorato, Massimiliano
author_sort	Bruhn, Miriam
title	Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence
title_short	Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence
title_full	Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence
title_fullStr	Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence
title_full_unstemmed	Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence
title_sort	legislative malapportionment and institutional persistence
publishDate	2012
url	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101102132755 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3948
_version_	1764389161432776704

Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence

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