Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure
Policy recommendations for infrastructure provision usually build on a well-established understanding of best practice for sector governance. Too rarely are they adapted to the country-specific political environment even if this is an area where po...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101025084550 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3938 |
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okr-10986-3938 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ANTI-CORRUPTION ASSETS BASIC SERVICE BEST PRACTICE BEST PRACTICES BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CASH TRANSFERS CITIZEN CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COLLUSION COMMON LAW CONDITIONALITY CONGESTION CONGESTION PRICING CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT POLITICIANS CORRUPTION CRIMINAL CRONIES DATA COLLECTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DECREES DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DEREGULATION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DICTATORSHIP DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION DRIVERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL INFORMATION EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTS EXECUTIVE POWER EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN POLICY FRAUD FREE PRESS FREEDOM OF SPEECH FUEL FUEL COSTS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT STATISTICS HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT HIGHWAYS HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN RIGHTS IDEOLOGIES INEQUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY JUDICIARY JUSTICE LABOR UNIONS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LAWS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LOBBYING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MEDIA MINISTER MINISTERS MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PATRONAGE PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INTERVENTION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POPULISM PORK BARREL POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRESENT VALUE PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION COSTS PROPAGANDA PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY MEASURES RESEARCH AGENDA RESOURCE CURSE RISK OF CORRUPTION ROAD ROAD MAINTENANCE ROADS SANCTION SANCTIONS SANITATION SECTORAL POLICIES SECURITIES SEPARATION OF POWERS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL PROGRAM SOVEREIGNTY STATE REVENUES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX TAX BASE TAX BURDEN TAX REGIME TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS THEFT TOLL TOLL ROADS TRAFFIC TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORT TRANSPORT SECTOR TRANSPORT SERVICES TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRUE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES URBAN TRANSPORT VESTED INTERESTS VOTING WAGES WEALTH WHITE ELEPHANTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ANTI-CORRUPTION ASSETS BASIC SERVICE BEST PRACTICE BEST PRACTICES BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CASH TRANSFERS CITIZEN CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COLLUSION COMMON LAW CONDITIONALITY CONGESTION CONGESTION PRICING CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT POLITICIANS CORRUPTION CRIMINAL CRONIES DATA COLLECTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DECREES DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DEREGULATION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DICTATORSHIP DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION DRIVERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL INFORMATION EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTS EXECUTIVE POWER EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN POLICY FRAUD FREE PRESS FREEDOM OF SPEECH FUEL FUEL COSTS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT STATISTICS HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT HIGHWAYS HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN RIGHTS IDEOLOGIES INEQUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY JUDICIARY JUSTICE LABOR UNIONS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LAWS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LOBBYING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MEDIA MINISTER MINISTERS MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PATRONAGE PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INTERVENTION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POPULISM PORK BARREL POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRESENT VALUE PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION COSTS PROPAGANDA PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY MEASURES RESEARCH AGENDA RESOURCE CURSE RISK OF CORRUPTION ROAD ROAD MAINTENANCE ROADS SANCTION SANCTIONS SANITATION SECTORAL POLICIES SECURITIES SEPARATION OF POWERS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL PROGRAM SOVEREIGNTY STATE REVENUES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX TAX BASE TAX BURDEN TAX REGIME TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS THEFT TOLL TOLL ROADS TRAFFIC TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORT TRANSPORT SECTOR TRANSPORT SERVICES TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRUE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES URBAN TRANSPORT VESTED INTERESTS VOTING WAGES WEALTH WHITE ELEPHANTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY Benitez, Daniel Estache, Antonio Soreide, Tina Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5455 |
| description |
Policy recommendations for
infrastructure provision usually build on a well-established
understanding of best practice for sector governance. Too
rarely are they adapted to the country-specific political
environment even if this is an area where policy choices are
likely to be subject to private agendas in politics. The
fact that such private agendas are often ignored goes a long
way toward explaining why infrastructure policies fail and
why best practice can be counterproductive. While
non-benevolence and rent-seeking are well described in the
literature and anecdotes abound, there is only limited
consideration of how the different incentive problems in
politics impede policy improvements in infrastructure. This
paper addresses why politics in infrastructure cannot be
ignored, drawing on theoretical results and a systematic
review of experiences. It reviews how different private
agendas in politics will have different impacts for
sector-governance decisions -- and hence service delivery.
The concept of best practice in policy recommendations
should be reconsidered in a wide perspective and allow for
tailored solutions based on an understanding of the given
incentive problems. Policy recommendations should take into
account how coordination trade-offs may complicate efforts
to reduce the possible impact of private agendas on
infrastructure policy decisions. Although more transparency
linked to service delivery indicators is a "safe"
recommendation, it is also clear that the demand for good
governance will not be sufficient to secure political
accountability in a sector with huge vested interests
combined with complicated funding schemes and complex contracts. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Benitez, Daniel Estache, Antonio Soreide, Tina |
| author_facet |
Benitez, Daniel Estache, Antonio Soreide, Tina |
| author_sort |
Benitez, Daniel |
| title |
Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
| title_short |
Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
| title_full |
Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
| title_fullStr |
Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
| title_sort |
dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101025084550 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3938 |
| _version_ |
1764389113982615552 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-39382021-04-23T14:02:13Z Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure Benitez, Daniel Estache, Antonio Soreide, Tina ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ANTI-CORRUPTION ASSETS BASIC SERVICE BEST PRACTICE BEST PRACTICES BRIBE BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CASH TRANSFERS CITIZEN CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COLLUSION COMMON LAW CONDITIONALITY CONGESTION CONGESTION PRICING CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT POLITICIANS CORRUPTION CRIMINAL CRONIES DATA COLLECTION DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DECREES DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES DEMOCRATIC REGIMES DEMOCRATIZATION DEREGULATION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DICTATORSHIP DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION DRIVERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL INFORMATION EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTS EXECUTIVE POWER EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL INFORMATION FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN OWNERSHIP FOREIGN POLICY FRAUD FREE PRESS FREEDOM OF SPEECH FUEL FUEL COSTS GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE GOVERNANCE REFORMS GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT STATISTICS HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT HIGHWAYS HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN RIGHTS IDEOLOGIES INEQUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM INITIATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY JUDICIARY JUSTICE LABOR UNIONS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LAWS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LOBBYING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MEDIA MINISTER MINISTERS MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PATRONAGE PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY DECISIONS POLICY INTERVENTION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL AGENDA POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL COMPETITION POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POPULISM PORK BARREL POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRESENT VALUE PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION COSTS PROPAGANDA PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEARINGS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY BODY REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY MEASURES RESEARCH AGENDA RESOURCE CURSE RISK OF CORRUPTION ROAD ROAD MAINTENANCE ROADS SANCTION SANCTIONS SANITATION SECTORAL POLICIES SECURITIES SEPARATION OF POWERS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL PROGRAM SOVEREIGNTY STATE REVENUES STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX TAX BASE TAX BURDEN TAX REGIME TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS THEFT TOLL TOLL ROADS TRAFFIC TRANSPARENCY TRANSPORT TRANSPORT SECTOR TRANSPORT SERVICES TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TRUE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES URBAN TRANSPORT VESTED INTERESTS VOTING WAGES WEALTH WHITE ELEPHANTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY Policy recommendations for infrastructure provision usually build on a well-established understanding of best practice for sector governance. Too rarely are they adapted to the country-specific political environment even if this is an area where policy choices are likely to be subject to private agendas in politics. The fact that such private agendas are often ignored goes a long way toward explaining why infrastructure policies fail and why best practice can be counterproductive. While non-benevolence and rent-seeking are well described in the literature and anecdotes abound, there is only limited consideration of how the different incentive problems in politics impede policy improvements in infrastructure. This paper addresses why politics in infrastructure cannot be ignored, drawing on theoretical results and a systematic review of experiences. It reviews how different private agendas in politics will have different impacts for sector-governance decisions -- and hence service delivery. The concept of best practice in policy recommendations should be reconsidered in a wide perspective and allow for tailored solutions based on an understanding of the given incentive problems. Policy recommendations should take into account how coordination trade-offs may complicate efforts to reduce the possible impact of private agendas on infrastructure policy decisions. Although more transparency linked to service delivery indicators is a "safe" recommendation, it is also clear that the demand for good governance will not be sufficient to secure political accountability in a sector with huge vested interests combined with complicated funding schemes and complex contracts. 2012-03-19T18:42:31Z 2012-03-19T18:42:31Z 2010-10-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101025084550 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3938 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5455 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |