Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India
This paper examines a puzzle in the political economy of infrastructure in India -- the co-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending in public budgets alongside evidence of large demand for village infrastructure from poor voters. It a...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100916114657 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3907 |
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okr-10986-39072021-04-23T14:02:13Z Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India Khemani, Stuti ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ANTI-CORRUPTION BENEFICIARY BUDGET CONSTRAINT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS CAPITAL PROJECTS CHECKS CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT SERVICING DECENTRALIZATION DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ECONOMIC ELITES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE ELECTRICITY ENABLING ENVIRONMENT EVASION FINANCES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL RESOURCES GOVERNMENT BUDGET GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNOR HOLDING HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME TAX INFORMATION DISSEMINATION INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTEREST PAYMENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT PROJECTS INVESTMENT SPENDING LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEVY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL REVENUE MASS MEDIA MAYORS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARLIAMENT POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POPULISM POVERTY REDUCTION PRIVATE INVESTMENTS PRIVATE INVESTORS PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC PUBLIC ACTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AGENCY PUBLIC BENEFITS PUBLIC BUDGETS PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROGRAMS PUBLIC PROVISION PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SCHOOLS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC UTILITIES RESERVE RESERVE BANK RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETURN RETURNS REVOLUTION ROADS SAVINGS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COST SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL SECTORS STATE ADMINISTRATION STATE BUDGETS STATE EMPLOYEES STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE INCOME STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES SUFFRAGE TAX TAX BURDEN TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION URBAN AREAS URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES UTILITIES VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER TURNOUT VOTERS VOTING This paper examines a puzzle in the political economy of infrastructure in India -- the co-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending in public budgets alongside evidence of large demand for village infrastructure from poor voters. It argues that this pattern is due to infrastructure projects being used at the margin for political rent-seeking, while spending on employment and welfare transfers are the preferred vehicles to win votes for re-election. New suggestive evidence on the variation of public spending composition across states, and within states over time is offered that is consistent with this argument. This evidence underscores a growing argument in the development literature that the level and composition of public spending per se may not be sufficient metrics to assess the quality of public goods policies -- greater infrastructure spending in some contexts may go to political rents rather than to the actual delivery of broad public goods for growth and poverty reduction. 2012-03-19T18:41:56Z 2012-03-19T18:41:56Z 2010-09-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100916114657 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3907 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5423 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia South Asia South Asia Asia India |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ANTI-CORRUPTION BENEFICIARY BUDGET CONSTRAINT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS CAPITAL PROJECTS CHECKS CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT SERVICING DECENTRALIZATION DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ECONOMIC ELITES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE ELECTRICITY ENABLING ENVIRONMENT EVASION FINANCES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL RESOURCES GOVERNMENT BUDGET GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNOR HOLDING HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME TAX INFORMATION DISSEMINATION INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTEREST PAYMENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT PROJECTS INVESTMENT SPENDING LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEVY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL REVENUE MASS MEDIA MAYORS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARLIAMENT POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POPULISM POVERTY REDUCTION PRIVATE INVESTMENTS PRIVATE INVESTORS PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC PUBLIC ACTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AGENCY PUBLIC BENEFITS PUBLIC BUDGETS PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROGRAMS PUBLIC PROVISION PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SCHOOLS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC UTILITIES RESERVE RESERVE BANK RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETURN RETURNS REVOLUTION ROADS SAVINGS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COST SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL SECTORS STATE ADMINISTRATION STATE BUDGETS STATE EMPLOYEES STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE INCOME STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES SUFFRAGE TAX TAX BURDEN TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION URBAN AREAS URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES UTILITIES VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER TURNOUT VOTERS VOTING |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ANTI-CORRUPTION BENEFICIARY BUDGET CONSTRAINT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS CAPITAL PROJECTS CHECKS CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT CITIZENS COALITION GOVERNMENTS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT SERVICING DECENTRALIZATION DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ECONOMIC ELITES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELECTION ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE ELECTRICITY ENABLING ENVIRONMENT EVASION FINANCES FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL RESOURCES GOVERNMENT BUDGET GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNOR HOLDING HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME TAX INFORMATION DISSEMINATION INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTEREST PAYMENTS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT PROJECTS INVESTMENT SPENDING LABOR MARKETS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEVY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL REVENUE MASS MEDIA MAYORS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARLIAMENT POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE POPULISM POVERTY REDUCTION PRIVATE INVESTMENTS PRIVATE INVESTORS PROPERTY TAXES PUBLIC PUBLIC ACTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AGENCY PUBLIC BENEFITS PUBLIC BUDGETS PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROGRAMS PUBLIC PROVISION PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SCHOOLS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC UTILITIES RESERVE RESERVE BANK RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETURN RETURNS REVOLUTION ROADS SAVINGS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COST SOCIAL PROGRAMS SOCIAL SECTORS STATE ADMINISTRATION STATE BUDGETS STATE EMPLOYEES STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE INCOME STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES SUFFRAGE TAX TAX BURDEN TAX RATE TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION URBAN AREAS URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES UTILITIES VOTER PARTICIPATION VOTER TURNOUT VOTERS VOTING Khemani, Stuti Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia South Asia South Asia Asia India |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5423 |
| description |
This paper examines a puzzle in the
political economy of infrastructure in India -- the
co-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending in
public budgets alongside evidence of large demand for
village infrastructure from poor voters. It argues that this
pattern is due to infrastructure projects being used at the
margin for political rent-seeking, while spending on
employment and welfare transfers are the preferred vehicles
to win votes for re-election. New suggestive evidence on the
variation of public spending composition across states, and
within states over time is offered that is consistent with
this argument. This evidence underscores a growing argument
in the development literature that the level and composition
of public spending per se may not be sufficient metrics to
assess the quality of public goods policies -- greater
infrastructure spending in some contexts may go to political
rents rather than to the actual delivery of broad public
goods for growth and poverty reduction. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Khemani, Stuti |
| title |
Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India |
| title_short |
Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India |
| title_full |
Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India |
| title_fullStr |
Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India |
| title_sort |
political economy of infrastructure spending in india |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100916114657 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3907 |
| _version_ |
1764388957631545344 |