Managing Subnational Credit and Default Risks
As a result of worldwide decentralization, subnational debt is rising. Subnational debt crises in major developing countries in the 1990s have led to strengthened regulatory frameworks for subnational borrowing and insolvency. With the fragility of...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100719154958 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3847 |
Summary: | As a result of worldwide
decentralization, subnational debt is rising. Subnational
debt crises in major developing countries in the 1990s have
led to strengthened regulatory frameworks for subnational
borrowing and insolvency. With the fragility of the global
recovery and increasing public debt, and the structural
trends of decentralization and urbanization, it becomes more
important to prudently manage subnational default risks.
Although the regulatory frameworks share central features,
the historical context and entry points for reform drive
variations across countries. Addressing soft budget
constraints is integral to the regulatory framework. Ex ante
fiscal rules for subnational governments attempt to limit
default risks; ex post regulation predictably allocates
default risk, while providing breathing space for orderly
debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment, as well as the
continued delivery of essential public services. The
regulatory reforms are inseparable from the reform of
broader intergovernmental fiscal systems and financial markets. |
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