Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help?
Low tax compliance in low- and middle-income countries around the world limits the ability of governments to offer effective public services. This paper reports the results of a randomly rolled out text message campaign aimed at promoting tax compl...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2022
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099747108222222580/IDU0f8171cd40cde7047ca0b17b091c7a6453c03 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37913 |
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okr-10986-379132022-08-24T05:10:37Z Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? Collin, Matthew Edward Di Maro, Vincenzo Evans, David K. Manang, Frederik TAX COMPLIANCE TAX MORALE PUBLIC FINANCE GOVERNMENT TEXT NOTIFICATIONS INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT) PROPERTY TAX PAYMENT REMINDERS Low tax compliance in low- and middle-income countries around the world limits the ability of governments to offer effective public services. This paper reports the results of a randomly rolled out text message campaign aimed at promoting tax compliance among landowners in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Landowners were randomly assigned to one of four groups designed to test different aspects of tax morale. They received a simple text message reminder to pay their tax (a test of salience), a message highlighting the connection between taxes and public services (reciprocity), a message communicating that people who did not pay were not contributing to local or national development (social pressure), or no message (control). Recipients of any message were 18 percent (or 2 percentage points) more likely to pay any property tax by the end of the study period. Each type of message resulted in gains in payment rates, although social pressure messages delivered the lowest gains. Total payment amounts were highest for those who received reciprocity messages. Nudges were most effective in areas with lower initial rates of tax compliance. The average estimated benefit-cost ratio across treatments is 36:1 due to the low cost of the intervention, with higher cost-effectiveness for reciprocity messages. 2022-08-23T14:17:02Z 2022-08-23T14:17:02Z 2022-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099747108222222580/IDU0f8171cd40cde7047ca0b17b091c7a6453c03 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37913 English en Policy Research Working Papers;10148 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Tanzania |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English English |
| topic |
TAX COMPLIANCE TAX MORALE PUBLIC FINANCE GOVERNMENT TEXT NOTIFICATIONS INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT) PROPERTY TAX PAYMENT REMINDERS |
| spellingShingle |
TAX COMPLIANCE TAX MORALE PUBLIC FINANCE GOVERNMENT TEXT NOTIFICATIONS INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT) PROPERTY TAX PAYMENT REMINDERS Collin, Matthew Edward Di Maro, Vincenzo Evans, David K. Manang, Frederik Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? |
| geographic_facet |
Tanzania |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Papers;10148 |
| description |
Low tax compliance in low- and
middle-income countries around the world limits the ability
of governments to offer effective public services. This
paper reports the results of a randomly rolled out text
message campaign aimed at promoting tax compliance among
landowners in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Landowners were
randomly assigned to one of four groups designed to test
different aspects of tax morale. They received a simple text
message reminder to pay their tax (a test of salience), a
message highlighting the connection between taxes and public
services (reciprocity), a message communicating that people
who did not pay were not contributing to local or national
development (social pressure), or no message (control).
Recipients of any message were 18 percent (or 2 percentage
points) more likely to pay any property tax by the end of
the study period. Each type of message resulted in gains in
payment rates, although social pressure messages delivered
the lowest gains. Total payment amounts were highest for
those who received reciprocity messages. Nudges were most
effective in areas with lower initial rates of tax
compliance. The average estimated benefit-cost ratio across
treatments is 36:1 due to the low cost of the intervention,
with higher cost-effectiveness for reciprocity messages. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Collin, Matthew Edward Di Maro, Vincenzo Evans, David K. Manang, Frederik |
| author_facet |
Collin, Matthew Edward Di Maro, Vincenzo Evans, David K. Manang, Frederik |
| author_sort |
Collin, Matthew Edward |
| title |
Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? |
| title_short |
Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? |
| title_full |
Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? |
| title_fullStr |
Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Property Tax Compliance in Tanzania : Can Nudges Help? |
| title_sort |
property tax compliance in tanzania : can nudges help? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2022 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099747108222222580/IDU0f8171cd40cde7047ca0b17b091c7a6453c03 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37913 |
| _version_ |
1764488116438040576 |