Decentralization (Localization) and Corruption : New Cross-Country Evidence
This paper attempts to improve the understanding and measurement of decentralization and its relationship with corruption in a worldwide context. This is done by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such relationship as well as using superior...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100510090347 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3785 |
| Summary: | This paper attempts to improve the
understanding and measurement of decentralization and its
relationship with corruption in a worldwide context. This is
done by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such
relationship as well as using superior and more defensible
measures of both decentralization in its various dimensions
as well as corruption for a sample of 182 countries. It is
the first paper that treats various tiers of local
governments (below the inter-mediate order of government) as
the unit of comparative analysis. In contrast, previous
analyses erroneously focused on subnational governments as
the unit of analysis which yields invalid cross-country
comparisons. By pursuing rigorous econometric analysis, the
paper demonstrates that decentralization, when properly
measured to mean moving government closer to people by
empowering local governments, is shown to have significant
negative effect on the incidence of corruption regardless of
the choice of the estimation procedures or the measures of
corruption used. In terms of various dimensions of
decentralized local governance, political decentralization
matters even when we control for fiscal decentralization.
Further voice (political accountability) is empirically
shown to be more important in combating corruption than exit
options made available through competition among jurisdictions. |
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