Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade
This paper provides a different basis than previous analyses for regional bloc formation and regional migration. Due to low bargaining power and fixed costs, small states face a severe disadvantage in negotiations with the rest of the world and mig...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100507111433 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3783 |
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okr-10986-37832021-04-23T14:02:12Z Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade Schiff, Maurice BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BLOC MEMBERS BLOC SIZE BRAIN DRAIN CAPITAL FLOWS CARIBBEAN REGION COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITY TRADE COMMON PROPERTY CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSTRAINT CONSUMER GOODS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM MODEL EXCESS SUPPLY EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FIXED COSTS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FREE ENTRY FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS GDP GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY GEOGRAPHIC REGION HOME COUNTRIES IMMIGRATION IMPACT OF MIGRATION INCOME SHARES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS INTERNATIONAL ARENA INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR FORCE LDCS M1 M2 MARGINAL BENEFIT MARGINAL IMPACT MARKET ACCESS MARKET DISTORTIONS MARKET SHARE MEMBER COUNTRIES MEMBER STATE MEMBER STATES MIGRANT MIGRANTS MIGRATION NATIONALS NATIONS NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATION COSTS NEGOTIATION RESOURCES OPPORTUNITY COST PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL ECONOMY PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRESS RECONSTRUCTION REGIONAL AGREEMENTS REGIONAL BLOC REGIONAL BLOC FORMATION REGIONAL BLOCS REGIONAL CONTRADICTIONS REGIONAL COOPERATION REGIONAL COST REGIONAL COSTS REGIONAL GROUPINGS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL MIGRATION REGIONAL SOLUTIONS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT REGIONAL WELFARE REGIONALISM REMITTANCES RESPECT TRADE AGREEMENT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE BLOC TRADE BLOCS TRADE EXPANSION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RELATIONSHIP TRADING PARTNERS TREATY VIRGIN WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WAGES WAR WELFARE IMPLICATIONS WTO This paper provides a different basis than previous analyses for regional bloc formation and regional migration. Due to low bargaining power and fixed costs, small states face a severe disadvantage in negotiations with the rest of the world and might benefit by forming a regional bloc. The study a) presents a general equilibrium model where bargaining power, international and regional negotiation costs, number of issues negotiated, and accession rule to the bloc determine its size and welfare impact; and b) examines the impact of international migration as well as the migration-trade relationship. The main findings are: i) the likelihood of regional bloc formation, its size and welfare impact, increases with international negotiation costs and the number of issues negotiated, and decreases with regional negotiation costs; ii) bloc size is optimal (below the optimum) if an accession fee is (is not) charged; iii) South-South migration raises bloc size and welfare; iv) South-South migration and trade are complements under market access negotiations and are substitutes under negotiations for unilateral transfers as well as under migrant remittances; and v) South-North migration and bloc formation, and South-North and South-South migration, are substitutes for the states that benefit from membership in the bloc. 2012-03-19T18:39:44Z 2012-03-19T18:39:44Z 2010-05-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100507111433 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3783 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5297 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BLOC MEMBERS BLOC SIZE BRAIN DRAIN CAPITAL FLOWS CARIBBEAN REGION COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITY TRADE COMMON PROPERTY CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSTRAINT CONSUMER GOODS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM MODEL EXCESS SUPPLY EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FIXED COSTS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FREE ENTRY FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS GDP GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY GEOGRAPHIC REGION HOME COUNTRIES IMMIGRATION IMPACT OF MIGRATION INCOME SHARES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS INTERNATIONAL ARENA INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR FORCE LDCS M1 M2 MARGINAL BENEFIT MARGINAL IMPACT MARKET ACCESS MARKET DISTORTIONS MARKET SHARE MEMBER COUNTRIES MEMBER STATE MEMBER STATES MIGRANT MIGRANTS MIGRATION NATIONALS NATIONS NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATION COSTS NEGOTIATION RESOURCES OPPORTUNITY COST PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL ECONOMY PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRESS RECONSTRUCTION REGIONAL AGREEMENTS REGIONAL BLOC REGIONAL BLOC FORMATION REGIONAL BLOCS REGIONAL CONTRADICTIONS REGIONAL COOPERATION REGIONAL COST REGIONAL COSTS REGIONAL GROUPINGS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL MIGRATION REGIONAL SOLUTIONS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT REGIONAL WELFARE REGIONALISM REMITTANCES RESPECT TRADE AGREEMENT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE BLOC TRADE BLOCS TRADE EXPANSION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RELATIONSHIP TRADING PARTNERS TREATY VIRGIN WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WAGES WAR WELFARE IMPLICATIONS WTO |
| spellingShingle |
BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BLOC MEMBERS BLOC SIZE BRAIN DRAIN CAPITAL FLOWS CARIBBEAN REGION COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMODITY TRADE COMMON PROPERTY CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSTRAINT CONSUMER GOODS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM MODEL EXCESS SUPPLY EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FIXED COSTS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FREE ENTRY FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS GDP GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY GEOGRAPHIC REGION HOME COUNTRIES IMMIGRATION IMPACT OF MIGRATION INCOME SHARES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS INTERNATIONAL ARENA INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR FORCE LDCS M1 M2 MARGINAL BENEFIT MARGINAL IMPACT MARKET ACCESS MARKET DISTORTIONS MARKET SHARE MEMBER COUNTRIES MEMBER STATE MEMBER STATES MIGRANT MIGRANTS MIGRATION NATIONALS NATIONS NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATION COSTS NEGOTIATION RESOURCES OPPORTUNITY COST PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL ECONOMY PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRESS RECONSTRUCTION REGIONAL AGREEMENTS REGIONAL BLOC REGIONAL BLOC FORMATION REGIONAL BLOCS REGIONAL CONTRADICTIONS REGIONAL COOPERATION REGIONAL COST REGIONAL COSTS REGIONAL GROUPINGS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL MIGRATION REGIONAL SOLUTIONS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT REGIONAL WELFARE REGIONALISM REMITTANCES RESPECT TRADE AGREEMENT TRADE BARRIERS TRADE BLOC TRADE BLOCS TRADE EXPANSION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE RELATIONSHIP TRADING PARTNERS TREATY VIRGIN WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WAGES WAR WELFARE IMPLICATIONS WTO Schiff, Maurice Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5297 |
| description |
This paper provides a different basis
than previous analyses for regional bloc formation and
regional migration. Due to low bargaining power and fixed
costs, small states face a severe disadvantage in
negotiations with the rest of the world and might benefit by
forming a regional bloc. The study a) presents a general
equilibrium model where bargaining power, international and
regional negotiation costs, number of issues negotiated, and
accession rule to the bloc determine its size and welfare
impact; and b) examines the impact of international
migration as well as the migration-trade relationship. The
main findings are: i) the likelihood of regional bloc
formation, its size and welfare impact, increases with
international negotiation costs and the number of issues
negotiated, and decreases with regional negotiation costs;
ii) bloc size is optimal (below the optimum) if an accession
fee is (is not) charged; iii) South-South migration raises
bloc size and welfare; iv) South-South migration and trade
are complements under market access negotiations and are
substitutes under negotiations for unilateral transfers as
well as under migrant remittances; and v) South-North
migration and bloc formation, and South-North and
South-South migration, are substitutes for the states that
benefit from membership in the bloc. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Schiff, Maurice |
| author_facet |
Schiff, Maurice |
| author_sort |
Schiff, Maurice |
| title |
Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade |
| title_short |
Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade |
| title_full |
Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade |
| title_fullStr |
Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Small State Regional Cooperation, South-South and South-North Migration, and International Trade |
| title_sort |
small state regional cooperation, south-south and south-north migration, and international trade |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100507111433 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3783 |
| _version_ |
1764388323036495872 |