Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty

Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty

To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade How do firms combine these to form transactional governance structures This paper answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-co...

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Main Authors: Francis, David C., Karalashvili, Nona, Murrell, Peter
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: Washington, DC : World Bank 2022
Subjects:
GOVERNANCE
TRANSACTIONS
LAW
BILATERALISM
TRANSACTION COSTS
UNCERTAINTY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099738507052218969/IDU0fb2722fc057f10461708ce60933971e612b2
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37668
id okr-10986-37668
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-376682022-07-09T05:10:38Z Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty Francis, David C. Karalashvili, Nona Murrell, Peter GOVERNANCE TRANSACTIONS LAW BILATERALISM TRANSACTION COSTS UNCERTAINTY To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade How do firms combine these to form transactional governance structures This paper answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-country setting that considers a full spectrum of transactional-governance strategies. The data collection requires a new survey question answerable in any context. The question is applied in six South American countries using representative samples, with the resultant survey weights facilitating a whole-economy analysis. Without imposing an a priori model, latent class analysis estimates meaningful governance structures. Bilateralism is always used. Law is never used alone. Bilateralism and formal institutions are rarely substitutes. Within country, inter-regional variation in governance is greater than inter-country variation. The usefulness of the data is shown by testing one element of Williamson's discriminating-alignment agenda: greater uncertainty in the transactional environment increases the involvement of third parties. 2022-07-08T19:23:44Z 2022-07-08T19:23:44Z 2022-07 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099738507052218969/IDU0fb2722fc057f10461708ce60933971e612b2 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37668 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;10118 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC : World Bank Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper World
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic GOVERNANCE
TRANSACTIONS
LAW
BILATERALISM
TRANSACTION COSTS
UNCERTAINTY
spellingShingle GOVERNANCE
TRANSACTIONS
LAW
BILATERALISM
TRANSACTION COSTS
UNCERTAINTY
Francis, David C.
Karalashvili, Nona
Murrell, Peter
Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
geographic_facet World
relation Policy Research Working Paper;10118
description To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade How do firms combine these to form transactional governance structures This paper answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-country setting that considers a full spectrum of transactional-governance strategies. The data collection requires a new survey question answerable in any context. The question is applied in six South American countries using representative samples, with the resultant survey weights facilitating a whole-economy analysis. Without imposing an a priori model, latent class analysis estimates meaningful governance structures. Bilateralism is always used. Law is never used alone. Bilateralism and formal institutions are rarely substitutes. Within country, inter-regional variation in governance is greater than inter-country variation. The usefulness of the data is shown by testing one element of Williamson's discriminating-alignment agenda: greater uncertainty in the transactional environment increases the involvement of third parties.
format Working Paper
author Francis, David C.
Karalashvili, Nona
Murrell, Peter
author_facet Francis, David C.
Karalashvili, Nona
Murrell, Peter
author_sort Francis, David C.
title Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
title_short Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
title_full Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
title_fullStr Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
title_sort transactional governance structures : new cross-country data and an application to the effect of uncertainty
publisher Washington, DC : World Bank
publishDate 2022
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099738507052218969/IDU0fb2722fc057f10461708ce60933971e612b2
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37668
_version_ 1764487633333911552

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