Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies

This paper considers the political influence of private firms. While such influence is frequently discussed, there is limited analysis of how firms combine political interactions, and under what conditions, to gain influence. The exception is the l...

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Main Authors: Francis, David C., Kubinec, Robert
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: Washington, DC : World Bank 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099855207052233298/IDU0158ecaac01be104fd80a04a03c9cf1992a74
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37646
id okr-10986-37646
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-376462022-07-07T05:10:44Z Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies Francis, David C. Kubinec, Robert POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS PRIVATE FIRMS BAYESIAN LATENT VARIABLES This paper considers the political influence of private firms. While such influence is frequently discussed, there is limited analysis of how firms combine political interactions, and under what conditions, to gain influence. The exception is the large literature on firms with political connections, with findings generally showing large gains to firms with those direct relationships. This paper extends the discussion of influence beyond political connections alone and uses a rich firm-level data set from 41 economies, which includes information on several interactions with political actors. Using a Bayesian item response theory (IRT) measurement model, an index of Political Influence is estimated, with the prior assumption that political connections yield more influence. Membership in a business association is found to enhance influence, while such influence is offset by bribes, state ownership, firm size, and a reliance on collective lobbying. Political Influence is found to be broadly higher in economies with poorer governance but more dispersed in those with better governance. Within economies, higher influence is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a small number of competitors, higher sales, and lower labor inputs relative to sales. These findings are robust across several models that incorporate high-dimensional fixed effects, incorporating measurement error in the index, and varying these relationships over several governance measures. 2022-07-06T17:22:40Z 2022-07-06T17:22:40Z 2022-07 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099855207052233298/IDU0158ecaac01be104fd80a04a03c9cf1992a74 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37646 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;10119 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC : World Bank Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper World
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic POLITICAL INFLUENCE
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
PRIVATE FIRMS
BAYESIAN
LATENT VARIABLES
spellingShingle POLITICAL INFLUENCE
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
PRIVATE FIRMS
BAYESIAN
LATENT VARIABLES
Francis, David C.
Kubinec, Robert
Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies
geographic_facet World
relation Policy Research Working Paper;10119
description This paper considers the political influence of private firms. While such influence is frequently discussed, there is limited analysis of how firms combine political interactions, and under what conditions, to gain influence. The exception is the large literature on firms with political connections, with findings generally showing large gains to firms with those direct relationships. This paper extends the discussion of influence beyond political connections alone and uses a rich firm-level data set from 41 economies, which includes information on several interactions with political actors. Using a Bayesian item response theory (IRT) measurement model, an index of Political Influence is estimated, with the prior assumption that political connections yield more influence. Membership in a business association is found to enhance influence, while such influence is offset by bribes, state ownership, firm size, and a reliance on collective lobbying. Political Influence is found to be broadly higher in economies with poorer governance but more dispersed in those with better governance. Within economies, higher influence is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a small number of competitors, higher sales, and lower labor inputs relative to sales. These findings are robust across several models that incorporate high-dimensional fixed effects, incorporating measurement error in the index, and varying these relationships over several governance measures.
format Working Paper
author Francis, David C.
Kubinec, Robert
author_facet Francis, David C.
Kubinec, Robert
author_sort Francis, David C.
title Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies
title_short Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies
title_full Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies
title_fullStr Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies
title_full_unstemmed Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-level Political Influence in 41 Economies
title_sort beyond political connections : a measurement model approach to estimating firm-level political influence in 41 economies
publisher Washington, DC : World Bank
publishDate 2022
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099855207052233298/IDU0158ecaac01be104fd80a04a03c9cf1992a74
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37646
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