Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities?
Many highly-disaggregated cross-country indicators of institutional quality and the business environment have been developed in recent years. The promise of these indicators is that they can be used to identify specific reform priorities that polic...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100331142656 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3746 |
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okr-10986-3746 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY ADDITIONAL REGRESSORS ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AGGREGATE INDICATOR AGGREGATE INDICATORS ALGORITHMS ANTICORRUPTION BENCHMARK BRIBERY BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL MARKETS CAUSAL EFFECT CAUSATION CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES COMPETITIVENESS CORRELATIONS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION TRENDS CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRY COVERAGE DEGREES OF FREEDOM DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTS ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINANCIAL HONESTY FINITE SAMPLES FOREIGN AID FOREIGN INVESTORS FORMAL ANALYSIS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNANCE REFORM GROWTH RATES GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH THEORIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION INVESTMENT CLIMATE JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS JUDICIAL DECISIONS LARGE NUMBER LEADING INDICATORS LINEAR REGRESSION MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MACROECONOMICS MATRIX MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASURING CORRUPTION MODEL SPECIFICATION MONOPOLY NORMAL DENSITY 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS NUMBER OF REGRESSORS NUMBER OF VARIABLES PANEL DATA PARSIMONIOUS MODELS POLITICAL FINANCING POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE CORRELATION PRICE CONTROLS PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC UTILITIES RANDOM VARIABLE REGULATORY OUTCOMES REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY QUALITY REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SAMPLE SIZE SET OF VARIABLES SLOPE COEFFICIENT SLOPE COEFFICIENTS SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS STANDARD DEVIATION STANDARD DEVIATIONS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAX COLLECTION TAX SYSTEM TRADE POLICY TRANSPARENCY UNIT INCREASE WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY ADDITIONAL REGRESSORS ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AGGREGATE INDICATOR AGGREGATE INDICATORS ALGORITHMS ANTICORRUPTION BENCHMARK BRIBERY BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL MARKETS CAUSAL EFFECT CAUSATION CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES COMPETITIVENESS CORRELATIONS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION TRENDS CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRY COVERAGE DEGREES OF FREEDOM DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTS ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINANCIAL HONESTY FINITE SAMPLES FOREIGN AID FOREIGN INVESTORS FORMAL ANALYSIS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNANCE REFORM GROWTH RATES GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH THEORIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION INVESTMENT CLIMATE JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS JUDICIAL DECISIONS LARGE NUMBER LEADING INDICATORS LINEAR REGRESSION MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MACROECONOMICS MATRIX MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASURING CORRUPTION MODEL SPECIFICATION MONOPOLY NORMAL DENSITY 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS NUMBER OF REGRESSORS NUMBER OF VARIABLES PANEL DATA PARSIMONIOUS MODELS POLITICAL FINANCING POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE CORRELATION PRICE CONTROLS PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC UTILITIES RANDOM VARIABLE REGULATORY OUTCOMES REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY QUALITY REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SAMPLE SIZE SET OF VARIABLES SLOPE COEFFICIENT SLOPE COEFFICIENTS SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS STANDARD DEVIATION STANDARD DEVIATIONS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAX COLLECTION TAX SYSTEM TRADE POLICY TRANSPARENCY UNIT INCREASE WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS Kraay, Aart Tawara, Norikazu Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5254 |
| description |
Many highly-disaggregated cross-country
indicators of institutional quality and the business
environment have been developed in recent years. The promise
of these indicators is that they can be used to identify
specific reform priorities that policymakers and aid donors
can target in their efforts to improve institutional and
regulatory quality outcomes. Doing so however requires
evidence on the partial effects of these many very detailed
variables on outcomes of interest, for example, investor
perceptions of corruption or the quality of the regulatory
environment. In this paper we use Bayesian Model Averaging
(BMA) to systematically document the partial correlations
between disaggregated indicators and several closely-related
outcome variables of interest using two leading datasets:
the Global Integrity Index and the Doing Business
indicators. We find major instability across outcomes and
across levels of disaggregation in the set of indicators
identified by BMA as important determinants of outcomes.
Disaggregated indicators that are important determinants of
one outcome are on average not important determinants of
other very similar outcomes. And for a given outcome
variable, indicators that are important at one level of
disaggregation are on average not important at other levels
of disaggregation. These findings illustrate the
difficulties in using highly-disaggregated indicators to
identify reform priorities. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Kraay, Aart Tawara, Norikazu |
| author_facet |
Kraay, Aart Tawara, Norikazu |
| author_sort |
Kraay, Aart |
| title |
Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? |
| title_short |
Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? |
| title_full |
Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? |
| title_fullStr |
Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? |
| title_sort |
can disaggregated indicators identify governance reform priorities? |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100331142656 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3746 |
| _version_ |
1764388115930152960 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-37462021-04-23T14:02:12Z Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities? Kraay, Aart Tawara, Norikazu ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY ADDITIONAL REGRESSORS ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AGGREGATE INDICATOR AGGREGATE INDICATORS ALGORITHMS ANTICORRUPTION BENCHMARK BRIBERY BUREAUCRACY BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL MARKETS CAUSAL EFFECT CAUSATION CITIZEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES COMPETITIVENESS CORRELATIONS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION TRENDS CORRUPTION VARIABLES COUNTRY COVERAGE DEGREES OF FREEDOM DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTS ERROR TERM EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FINANCIAL HONESTY FINITE SAMPLES FOREIGN AID FOREIGN INVESTORS FORMAL ANALYSIS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNANCE REFORM GROWTH RATES GROWTH REGRESSION GROWTH THEORIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPROVING GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION INVESTMENT CLIMATE JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS JUDICIAL DECISIONS LARGE NUMBER LEADING INDICATORS LINEAR REGRESSION MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MACROECONOMICS MATRIX MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASURING CORRUPTION MODEL SPECIFICATION MONOPOLY NORMAL DENSITY 0 HYPOTHESIS NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS NUMBER OF REGRESSORS NUMBER OF VARIABLES PANEL DATA PARSIMONIOUS MODELS POLITICAL FINANCING POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE CORRELATION PRICE CONTROLS PROBABILITIES PROBABILITY PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC INFORMATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC UTILITIES RANDOM VARIABLE REGULATORY OUTCOMES REGULATORY POLICY REGULATORY QUALITY REVERSE CAUSATION RULE OF LAW SAMPLE SIZE SET OF VARIABLES SLOPE COEFFICIENT SLOPE COEFFICIENTS SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS STANDARD DEVIATION STANDARD DEVIATIONS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAX COLLECTION TAX SYSTEM TRADE POLICY TRANSPARENCY UNIT INCREASE WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS Many highly-disaggregated cross-country indicators of institutional quality and the business environment have been developed in recent years. The promise of these indicators is that they can be used to identify specific reform priorities that policymakers and aid donors can target in their efforts to improve institutional and regulatory quality outcomes. Doing so however requires evidence on the partial effects of these many very detailed variables on outcomes of interest, for example, investor perceptions of corruption or the quality of the regulatory environment. In this paper we use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to systematically document the partial correlations between disaggregated indicators and several closely-related outcome variables of interest using two leading datasets: the Global Integrity Index and the Doing Business indicators. We find major instability across outcomes and across levels of disaggregation in the set of indicators identified by BMA as important determinants of outcomes. Disaggregated indicators that are important determinants of one outcome are on average not important determinants of other very similar outcomes. And for a given outcome variable, indicators that are important at one level of disaggregation are on average not important at other levels of disaggregation. These findings illustrate the difficulties in using highly-disaggregated indicators to identify reform priorities. 2012-03-19T18:39:04Z 2012-03-19T18:39:04Z 2010-03-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100331142656 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3746 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5254 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |