Corporate Governance and Public Corruption
Corporate governance in the private sector and corruption are important for economic development and private sector development. This paper investigates how corporate governance in private-sector media companies can affect public corruption. The an...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100304154357 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3719 |
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okr-10986-37192021-04-23T14:02:12Z Corporate Governance and Public Corruption Cusolito, Ana ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ASSET PRICES BANK POLICY BIDS BRIBE BRIBES BROADCASTING SYSTEM CHARTER CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS COLLUSION COMPANY CONSOLIDATION CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECTS CORPORATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION CORPORATIONS CORRUPT CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DIVIDEND DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC PROGRESS ECONOMIC RESEARCH EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EX ANTE EXCHANGE CONTROLS EXPECTED UTILITY EXPROPRIATION EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS FIRM PERFORMANCE FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP HOLDING HOLDINGS INCOME INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT VENTURES LARGE SHAREHOLDER LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LIBERALIZATION MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS MARKET CONCENTRATION MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MEDIA MINORITY OWNERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL GDP RETURN SOCIETY STOLEN PUBLIC FUNDS TAX TURNOVER VOTERS WEALTH Corporate governance in the private sector and corruption are important for economic development and private sector development. This paper investigates how corporate governance in private-sector media companies can affect public corruption. The analytical framework, based on models of corporate governance, identifies two channels through which media ownership concentration affects corruption: an owner effect, which discourages corruption and a competition-for-control effect that enhances it. When the ownership structure of a newspaper has a majority shareholder, the first effect dominates and corruption decreases as ownership becomes more concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders. Without majority shareholders, the competition-for-control effect dominates and corruption increases with the concentration of ownership of the media company. Thus, the paper shows that cases of intermediate media-ownership concentration are the worst at promoting public accountability, while extreme situations, where the ownership is completely concentrated or widely held, can result in similar and lower levels of corruption. 2012-03-19T18:38:36Z 2012-03-19T18:38:36Z 2010-03-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100304154357 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3719 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5233 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ASSET PRICES BANK POLICY BIDS BRIBE BRIBES BROADCASTING SYSTEM CHARTER CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS COLLUSION COMPANY CONSOLIDATION CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECTS CORPORATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION CORPORATIONS CORRUPT CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DIVIDEND DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC PROGRESS ECONOMIC RESEARCH EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EX ANTE EXCHANGE CONTROLS EXPECTED UTILITY EXPROPRIATION EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS FIRM PERFORMANCE FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP HOLDING HOLDINGS INCOME INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT VENTURES LARGE SHAREHOLDER LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LIBERALIZATION MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS MARKET CONCENTRATION MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MEDIA MINORITY OWNERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL GDP RETURN SOCIETY STOLEN PUBLIC FUNDS TAX TURNOVER VOTERS WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY AGENCY COSTS ASSET PRICES BANK POLICY BIDS BRIBE BRIBES BROADCASTING SYSTEM CHARTER CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS COLLUSION COMPANY CONSOLIDATION CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECTS CORPORATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION CORPORATIONS CORRUPT CORRUPTION DEMOCRACY DIVIDEND DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC PROGRESS ECONOMIC RESEARCH EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EX ANTE EXCHANGE CONTROLS EXPECTED UTILITY EXPROPRIATION EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS FIRM PERFORMANCE FREE RIDER FREE RIDER PROBLEM GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP HOLDING HOLDINGS INCOME INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT VENTURES LARGE SHAREHOLDER LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LIBERALIZATION MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS MARKET CONCENTRATION MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MEDIA MINORITY OWNERS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL STABILITY POLITICIAN POLITICIANS PRIVATE PROPERTY PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL GDP RETURN SOCIETY STOLEN PUBLIC FUNDS TAX TURNOVER VOTERS WEALTH Cusolito, Ana Corporate Governance and Public Corruption |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5233 |
| description |
Corporate governance in the private
sector and corruption are important for economic development
and private sector development. This paper investigates how
corporate governance in private-sector media companies can
affect public corruption. The analytical framework, based on
models of corporate governance, identifies two channels
through which media ownership concentration affects
corruption: an owner effect, which discourages corruption
and a competition-for-control effect that enhances it. When
the ownership structure of a newspaper has a majority
shareholder, the first effect dominates and corruption
decreases as ownership becomes more concentrated in the
hands of majority shareholders. Without majority
shareholders, the competition-for-control effect dominates
and corruption increases with the concentration of ownership
of the media company. Thus, the paper shows that cases of
intermediate media-ownership concentration are the worst at
promoting public accountability, while extreme situations,
where the ownership is completely concentrated or widely
held, can result in similar and lower levels of corruption. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Cusolito, Ana |
| author_facet |
Cusolito, Ana |
| author_sort |
Cusolito, Ana |
| title |
Corporate Governance and Public Corruption |
| title_short |
Corporate Governance and Public Corruption |
| title_full |
Corporate Governance and Public Corruption |
| title_fullStr |
Corporate Governance and Public Corruption |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Corporate Governance and Public Corruption |
| title_sort |
corporate governance and public corruption |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100304154357 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3719 |
| _version_ |
1764387984843472896 |