Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy
This paper estimates a model of a government making trade policy adjustments under a self-enforcing trade agreement in the presence of economic shocks. The empirical model is motivated by the formal theories of cooperative trade agreements. The aut...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100301085442 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3710 |
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okr-10986-37102021-04-23T14:02:12Z Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy Bown, Chad P. Crowley, Meredith A. ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING ACTION ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DATABASE ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING POLICIES ANTIDUMPING POLICY BILATERAL IMPORTS BILATERAL TRADE BUSINESS CYCLE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE COMMERCIAL POLICY CONTROL VARIABLES COUNTRY DUMMY CURRENCY DEMAND CURVE DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC SHOCK ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMIC THEORY ELASTICITY OF EXPORT EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXPLANATORY VARIABLE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES EXPORT GOODS EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOREIGN COUNTRY FOREIGN CURRENCY FOREIGN MARKET FOREIGN SOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES IMPORT IMPORT DEMAND IMPORT GROWTH IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT VOLUME IMPORT VOLUMES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INDICATOR VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION INVENTORIES INVENTORY LOW TARIFFS MARGINAL EFFECTS MARKET ACCESS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET POWER MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MEMBER COUNTRIES MEMBER COUNTRY NASH EQUILIBRIUM OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS OPTIMAL TARIFF OPTIMAL TARIFFS POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EFFECTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT REAL APPRECIATION REAL EXCHANGE RATE REAL EXCHANGE RATES RECIPROCITY ROBUSTNESS CHECK ROBUSTNESS CHECKS STANDARD DEVIATION TARIFF CHANGE TARIFF CONCESSION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF INCREASE TARIFF INCREASES TARIFF LINE TARIFF ON IMPORTS TARIFF POLICY TARIFF REDUCTION TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE GAIN TERMS-OF-TRADE EFFECT TERMS-OF-TRADE GAINS TOTAL EXPORTS TRADE AGREEMENT TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE DISPUTES TRADE EFFECT TRADE FLOWS TRADE GROWTH TRADE MOTIVES TRADE PARTNER TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REMEDIES TRADE VOLUME TRADE VOLUMES TRADING PARTNER TRADING PARTNERS VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO This paper estimates a model of a government making trade policy adjustments under a self-enforcing trade agreement in the presence of economic shocks. The empirical model is motivated by the formal theories of cooperative trade agreements. The authors find evidence that United States' use of its antidumping policy during 1997-2006 is consistent with increases in time-varying "cooperative" tariffs, where the likelihood of antidumping is increasing in the size of unexpected import surges, decreasing in the volatility of imports, and decreasing in the elasticities of import demand and export supply. The analysis finds additional support for the theory that some US antidumping use is consistent with cooperative behavior through a second empirical examination of how trading partners responded to these new US tariffs. Even after controlling for factors such as the expected cost and benefit to filing a WTO dispute or engaging in antidumping retaliation, the analysis find that trading partners are less likely to challenge such "cooperative" US antidumping tariffs that were imposed under terms-of-trade pressure suggested by the theory. 2012-03-19T18:38:20Z 2012-03-19T18:38:20Z 2010-03-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100301085442 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3710 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5223 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING ACTION ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DATABASE ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING POLICIES ANTIDUMPING POLICY BILATERAL IMPORTS BILATERAL TRADE BUSINESS CYCLE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE COMMERCIAL POLICY CONTROL VARIABLES COUNTRY DUMMY CURRENCY DEMAND CURVE DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC SHOCK ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMIC THEORY ELASTICITY OF EXPORT EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXPLANATORY VARIABLE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES EXPORT GOODS EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOREIGN COUNTRY FOREIGN CURRENCY FOREIGN MARKET FOREIGN SOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES IMPORT IMPORT DEMAND IMPORT GROWTH IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT VOLUME IMPORT VOLUMES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INDICATOR VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION INVENTORIES INVENTORY LOW TARIFFS MARGINAL EFFECTS MARKET ACCESS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET POWER MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MEMBER COUNTRIES MEMBER COUNTRY NASH EQUILIBRIUM OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS OPTIMAL TARIFF OPTIMAL TARIFFS POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EFFECTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT REAL APPRECIATION REAL EXCHANGE RATE REAL EXCHANGE RATES RECIPROCITY ROBUSTNESS CHECK ROBUSTNESS CHECKS STANDARD DEVIATION TARIFF CHANGE TARIFF CONCESSION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF INCREASE TARIFF INCREASES TARIFF LINE TARIFF ON IMPORTS TARIFF POLICY TARIFF REDUCTION TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE GAIN TERMS-OF-TRADE EFFECT TERMS-OF-TRADE GAINS TOTAL EXPORTS TRADE AGREEMENT TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE DISPUTES TRADE EFFECT TRADE FLOWS TRADE GROWTH TRADE MOTIVES TRADE PARTNER TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REMEDIES TRADE VOLUME TRADE VOLUMES TRADING PARTNER TRADING PARTNERS VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO |
| spellingShingle |
ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING ACTION ANTIDUMPING CASES ANTIDUMPING DATABASE ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ANTIDUMPING DUTY ANTIDUMPING POLICIES ANTIDUMPING POLICY BILATERAL IMPORTS BILATERAL TRADE BUSINESS CYCLE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE COMMERCIAL POLICY CONTROL VARIABLES COUNTRY DUMMY CURRENCY DEMAND CURVE DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC SHOCK ECONOMIC SHOCKS ECONOMIC THEORY ELASTICITY OF EXPORT EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXPLANATORY VARIABLE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES EXPORT GOODS EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITY FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOREIGN COUNTRY FOREIGN CURRENCY FOREIGN MARKET FOREIGN SOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES IMPORT IMPORT DEMAND IMPORT GROWTH IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT RESTRICTION IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPORT VOLUME IMPORT VOLUMES INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INDICATOR VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION INVENTORIES INVENTORY LOW TARIFFS MARGINAL EFFECTS MARKET ACCESS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET POWER MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MEMBER COUNTRIES MEMBER COUNTRY NASH EQUILIBRIUM OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS OPTIMAL TARIFF OPTIMAL TARIFFS POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EFFECTS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT REAL APPRECIATION REAL EXCHANGE RATE REAL EXCHANGE RATES RECIPROCITY ROBUSTNESS CHECK ROBUSTNESS CHECKS STANDARD DEVIATION TARIFF CHANGE TARIFF CONCESSION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF INCREASE TARIFF INCREASES TARIFF LINE TARIFF ON IMPORTS TARIFF POLICY TARIFF REDUCTION TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE GAIN TERMS-OF-TRADE EFFECT TERMS-OF-TRADE GAINS TOTAL EXPORTS TRADE AGREEMENT TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE DISPUTES TRADE EFFECT TRADE FLOWS TRADE GROWTH TRADE MOTIVES TRADE PARTNER TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REMEDIES TRADE VOLUME TRADE VOLUMES TRADING PARTNER TRADING PARTNERS VALUE OF IMPORTS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Bown, Chad P. Crowley, Meredith A. Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5223 |
| description |
This paper estimates a model of a
government making trade policy adjustments under a
self-enforcing trade agreement in the presence of economic
shocks. The empirical model is motivated by the formal
theories of cooperative trade agreements. The authors find
evidence that United States' use of its antidumping
policy during 1997-2006 is consistent with increases in
time-varying "cooperative" tariffs, where the
likelihood of antidumping is increasing in the size of
unexpected import surges, decreasing in the volatility of
imports, and decreasing in the elasticities of import demand
and export supply. The analysis finds additional support for
the theory that some US antidumping use is consistent with
cooperative behavior through a second empirical examination
of how trading partners responded to these new US tariffs.
Even after controlling for factors such as the expected cost
and benefit to filing a WTO dispute or engaging in
antidumping retaliation, the analysis find that trading
partners are less likely to challenge such
"cooperative" US antidumping tariffs that were
imposed under terms-of-trade pressure suggested by the theory. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Bown, Chad P. Crowley, Meredith A. |
| author_facet |
Bown, Chad P. Crowley, Meredith A. |
| author_sort |
Bown, Chad P. |
| title |
Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy |
| title_short |
Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy |
| title_full |
Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy |
| title_fullStr |
Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy |
| title_sort |
self-enforcing trade agreements : evidence from time-varying trade policy |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100301085442 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3710 |
| _version_ |
1764387934459396096 |