Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities

Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities

Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increase...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Xu, Gang, Xu, L. Colin, Si, Ruichao
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Washington, DC: World Bank 2022
Subjects:
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP; TIME-VARYING VARIABLE; POLITICAL CYCLE; LINEAR TIME TREND; BUREAU OF STATISTIC; PUBLIC SECTOR JOB; PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE; QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY; LOCAL ECONOMIC GROWTH; OPEN DOOR; REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET; HIGH POPULATION DENSITY; LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; AMOUNT OF POWER; REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE; REAL GDP; CAREER COMPENSATION; VALUE ADDED; BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE; BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM; FISCAL REVENUE; SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES; ECONOMIC REGION; CAREER TRACK; SUMMARY STATISTIC; DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC; LIGHT INTENSITY; TERTIARY SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL VALUE; CAREER ADVANCEMENT; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; RATCHET EFFECT; FIRST YEAR; POLITICAL COMPETITION; ECONOMETRIC MODEL; ECONOMIC STATISTIC; STRATEGIC COMPETITION; TARGET SETTING; DATA MANIPULATION; SAMPLE SURVEY; WEIGHTED AVERAGE; POLITICAL INCENTIVE; CATERING SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL SECTOR; CITY GOVERNMENT; LOCAL DEVELOPMENT; PARTY COMMITTEE; NEGATIVE VALUE; SMALL AREA; LOW DENSITY; LOCAL CONDITION; AGGREGATE OUTCOME; INSURANCE SECTOR; COMPLEMENTARY FACTOR; GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR; COAL MINE; TOTAL OUTPUT; ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY; COMMUNIST PARTY; GENERAL LITERATURE; ADMINISTRATIVE RANKS; POLITICAL MECHANISM; CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISE; PROFESSIONAL LIFE; DATA PROCESSING; PERFORMANCE METRICS; RAW DATA; CRIMINAL PENALTY; REGRESSION RESULTS; REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION; STANDARD DEVIATION; NEGATIVE SIGN; SOLID LINE; ROBUSTNESS CHECK; FREIGHT VOLUME; BASELINE REGRESSION; EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION; HIGH PROBABILITY; JOB LOSS; GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY; SUBSEQUENT YEARS; TAKE TIME; ENTRY DATE; CITY LEADERSHIP; PERSONAL NETWORK; LOWER COSTS; OTHER SECTORS; ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL; PARSIMONIOUS MODEL; LINEAR TREND; COMMON POLITICAL; MARGINAL RETURN; PARTY DISCIPLINE; STATISTICAL AGENCY; LIMITED INFORMATION; PREFECTURE GOVERNMENTS; RECENT YEARS; AIR FORCE; CLOUD COVER; HUMAN SETTLEMENT; GOVERNMENT PLAY; CITY OFFICIAL; ETHNIC MINORITIES; AVAILABLE DATA; COLLECTED DATA; GREAT POWER; LOCAL POLITICIAN; PROMOTION RATE; GOVERNMENT CADRE; SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK; DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC; SATELLITE DATA; FIXED EFFECT; FITTED VALUE; MEASUREMENT ERROR; TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION; PERFORMANCE REPORTING; COMPETITION FRAMEWORK; INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT; STATE CAPACITY; RESEARCH SUPPORT; SEVERAL REASONS; MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL INTEREST; EMPIRICAL RESULT; CENTRALIZED STATE; INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT; DELIVERING SERVICES; PUBLIC SERVICES; PRIVATE BENEFIT; RENT SEEKER; PUBLIC CHOICE; BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY; ACROSS PROVINCE; LOCAL ECONOMY; PROMOTING GROWTH; PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE; GOOD PERFORMANCE; ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY; DATA QUALITY; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; OPEN ACCESS; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE; DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/430701644941429406/Bureaucrats-Tournament-Competition-and-Performance-Manipulation-Evidence-from-Chinese-Cities
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37014
Description
Summary:Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increases over the course of the first term of the top bureaucrat, peaking in the last year of his or her term. Winning a tournament competition is behind this performance manipulation: political rivals reinforce each other in exaggerating performance, and political competition intensifies the tendency for manipulation. Performance exaggeration leads to higher chances of promotion, but the ratchet effect (that is, better performance today leading to a higher target tomorrow) and the potential to blame predecessors induce restraint. A good local institutional environment also restrains performance manipulation.

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