Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling

This study develops a computable general equilibrium model for Nigeria, which accounts for informality, tax evasion, and fuel smuggling. By studying the impact of fuel subsidy reform on consumption, tax incidence, and fiscal efficiency, it shows th...

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Main Authors: Rentschler, Jun, Hosoe, Nobuhiro
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/631951642691400564/Illicit-Schemes-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidy-Reforms-and-the-Role-of-Tax-Evasion-and-Smuggling
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36878
id okr-10986-36878
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-368782022-01-28T05:10:35Z Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling Rentschler, Jun Hosoe, Nobuhiro FUEL SUBSIDY TAX EVASION SMUGGLING CGE MODEL This study develops a computable general equilibrium model for Nigeria, which accounts for informality, tax evasion, and fuel smuggling. By studying the impact of fuel subsidy reform on consumption, tax incidence, and fiscal efficiency, it shows that the presence of illicit activities substantially strengthens the argument in favour of subsidy reform: First, fuel subsidy reform can shift the tax base to energy goods, which are less prone to tax evasion losses than for instance labour. Second, by reducing price differentials with neighbouring countries, subsidy reform reduces incentives for fuel smuggling. Overall, the results show that considering illicit activities reduces the welfare losses of fuel subsidy reform by at least 40 percent. In addition, fuel subsidy reductions (and by extension energy tax increases) have a strong progressive distributional impact. The findings hold under different revenue redistribution mechanisms, in particular uniform cash transfers and the reduction of pre-existing labour taxes. 2022-01-27T13:40:41Z 2022-01-27T13:40:41Z 2022-01 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/631951642691400564/Illicit-Schemes-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidy-Reforms-and-the-Role-of-Tax-Evasion-and-Smuggling http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36878 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9907 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Africa Western and Central (AFW) Nigeria
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic FUEL SUBSIDY
TAX EVASION
SMUGGLING
CGE MODEL
spellingShingle FUEL SUBSIDY
TAX EVASION
SMUGGLING
CGE MODEL
Rentschler, Jun
Hosoe, Nobuhiro
Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling
geographic_facet Africa
Africa Western and Central (AFW)
Nigeria
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9907
description This study develops a computable general equilibrium model for Nigeria, which accounts for informality, tax evasion, and fuel smuggling. By studying the impact of fuel subsidy reform on consumption, tax incidence, and fiscal efficiency, it shows that the presence of illicit activities substantially strengthens the argument in favour of subsidy reform: First, fuel subsidy reform can shift the tax base to energy goods, which are less prone to tax evasion losses than for instance labour. Second, by reducing price differentials with neighbouring countries, subsidy reform reduces incentives for fuel smuggling. Overall, the results show that considering illicit activities reduces the welfare losses of fuel subsidy reform by at least 40 percent. In addition, fuel subsidy reductions (and by extension energy tax increases) have a strong progressive distributional impact. The findings hold under different revenue redistribution mechanisms, in particular uniform cash transfers and the reduction of pre-existing labour taxes.
format Working Paper
author Rentschler, Jun
Hosoe, Nobuhiro
author_facet Rentschler, Jun
Hosoe, Nobuhiro
author_sort Rentschler, Jun
title Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling
title_short Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling
title_full Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling
title_fullStr Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling
title_full_unstemmed Illicit Schemes : Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms and the Role of Tax Evasion and Smuggling
title_sort illicit schemes : fossil fuel subsidy reforms and the role of tax evasion and smuggling
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2022
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/631951642691400564/Illicit-Schemes-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidy-Reforms-and-the-Role-of-Tax-Evasion-and-Smuggling
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36878
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