Can Islands of Effectiveness Thrive in Difficult Governance Settings? The Political Economy of Local-level Collaborative Governance
Many low-income countries contend with a governance syndrome characterized by a difficult combination of seeming openness, weak institutions, and strong inter-elite contestation for power and resources. In such countries, neither broad-based policy...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111011150735 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3608 |
| Summary: | Many low-income countries contend with a
governance syndrome characterized by a difficult combination
of seeming openness, weak institutions, and strong
inter-elite contestation for power and resources. In such
countries, neither broad-based policy nor public management
reforms are likely to be feasible. But are broad-based
approaches necessary? Theory and evidence suggest that in
such settings progress could be driven by "islands of
effectiveness" -- narrowly-focused initiatives that
combine high-quality institutional arrangements at the
micro-level, plus supportive, narrowly-targeted policy
reforms. This paper explores whether and how local-level
collaborative governance can provide a platform for these
islands of effectiveness. Drawing on the analytical
framework developed by the Nobel-prize winning social
scientist Elinor Ostrom, the paper reviews the underpinnings
of successful collaborative governance. It introduces a
simple model for exploring the interactions between
collaborative governance and political economy. The model
highlights the conditions under which coordination is
capable of countering threats from predators seeking to
capture the returns from collaborative governance for
themselves. The relative strength in the broader environment
of two opposing networks emerges as key -- "threat
networks" to which predators have access, and
countervailing "trumping networks" on which
protagonists of effective collaborative governance can draw.
The paper illustrates the potential practical relevance of
the approach with three heuristic examples: the governance
of schools, fisheries, and road construction and
maintenance. It concludes by laying out an agenda for
further empirical research, and suggesting what might be the
implications of the approach for future operational practice. |
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