Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests
Payments for environmental services are a nature conservation policy in which landowners receive financial compensation conditional on verified environmental service delivery. Contracts for payments for environmental services have been found to be...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/216171623174715621/Incentivizing-Conservation-of-de-facto-Community-Owned-Forests http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35730 |
| id |
okr-10986-35730 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-357302021-06-11T05:11:34Z Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests van Soest, Daan Adjognon, Guigonan Serge van der Heijden, Eline FOREST MANAGEMENT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOREST CONSERVATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM PAYMENT SCHEME DEFORESTATION Payments for environmental services are a nature conservation policy in which landowners receive financial compensation conditional on verified environmental service delivery. Contracts for payments for environmental services have been found to be effective in inducing conservation on private lands, but they may give rise to strong free-riding incentives when implemented on lands that are, de facto or de jure, commonly owned. This study implemented a randomized controlled trial in arid Burkina Faso to test the relative effectiveness of two collective payment for environmental services schemes in inducing forest conservation—a linear group payment scheme, in which group payments increase linearly with tree survival rates, and a threshold group payment scheme. The extant theory predicts that the latter incentive mechanism will (weakly) outperform the former. This paper develops a new theory that shows that the reverse may also hold—but only if the relationship between effort and tree survival rates is very uncertain. The findings show that threshold group payments increase intermediate measures of cooperation, but—consistent with Burkina Faso’s harsh conditions rendering tree survival quite stochastic—actual survival rates are higher with the linear group payments. The paper presents field experimental evidence as well as lab experimental results to explore the mechanisms giving rise to these results. 2021-06-10T14:31:15Z 2021-06-10T14:31:15Z 2021-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/216171623174715621/Incentivizing-Conservation-of-de-facto-Community-Owned-Forests http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35730 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9693 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Africa Western and Central (AFW) Burkina Faso |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
FOREST MANAGEMENT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOREST CONSERVATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM PAYMENT SCHEME DEFORESTATION |
| spellingShingle |
FOREST MANAGEMENT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOREST CONSERVATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM PAYMENT SCHEME DEFORESTATION van Soest, Daan Adjognon, Guigonan Serge van der Heijden, Eline Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Africa Western and Central (AFW) Burkina Faso |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9693 |
| description |
Payments for environmental services are
a nature conservation policy in which landowners receive
financial compensation conditional on verified environmental
service delivery. Contracts for payments for environmental
services have been found to be effective in inducing
conservation on private lands, but they may give rise to
strong free-riding incentives when implemented on lands that
are, de facto or de jure, commonly owned. This study
implemented a randomized controlled trial in arid Burkina
Faso to test the relative effectiveness of two collective
payment for environmental services schemes in inducing
forest conservation—a linear group payment scheme, in which
group payments increase linearly with tree survival rates,
and a threshold group payment scheme. The extant theory
predicts that the latter incentive mechanism will (weakly)
outperform the former. This paper develops a new theory that
shows that the reverse may also hold—but only if the
relationship between effort and tree survival rates is very
uncertain. The findings show that threshold group payments
increase intermediate measures of cooperation,
but—consistent with Burkina Faso’s harsh conditions
rendering tree survival quite stochastic—actual survival
rates are higher with the linear group payments. The paper
presents field experimental evidence as well as lab
experimental results to explore the mechanisms giving rise
to these results. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
van Soest, Daan Adjognon, Guigonan Serge van der Heijden, Eline |
| author_facet |
van Soest, Daan Adjognon, Guigonan Serge van der Heijden, Eline |
| author_sort |
van Soest, Daan |
| title |
Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests |
| title_short |
Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests |
| title_full |
Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests |
| title_fullStr |
Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Incentivizing Conservation of de facto Community-Owned Forests |
| title_sort |
incentivizing conservation of de facto community-owned forests |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/216171623174715621/Incentivizing-Conservation-of-de-facto-Community-Owned-Forests http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35730 |
| _version_ |
1764483662370308096 |