Information, Loss Framing, and Spillovers in Pay-for-Performance Contracts

Information, Loss Framing, and Spillovers in Pay-for-Performance Contracts

Do incentives matter beyond the information conveyed by pay-for-performance contracts? Does loss framing matter? And do incomplete contracts generate spillovers on unincentivized tasks? This study reports on a framed field experiment with 1,363 mat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bauhoff, Sebastian, Kandpal, Eeshani
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2021
Subjects:
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE
CROWDING OUT
HEALTH WORKERS
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH SERVICES
HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/918691622646942703/Information-Loss-Framing-and-Spillovers-in-Pay-for-Performance-Contracts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35724

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/918691622646942703/Information-Loss-Framing-and-Spillovers-in-Pay-for-Performance-Contracts
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35724

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