Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code
In the Philippines' highly decentralized political system, smooth functioning of inter-governmental relations is key to effective service delivery and good governance overall. Although considered a milestone, the 1991 Local Government Code, th...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110909084732 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3556 |
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okr-10986-3556 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE ASSETS BICAMERAL BODY CABINET CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CENTRALIZING CITIES CIVIL SOCIETY COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS CONVERSIONS DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE DEVOLUTION DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS DISTRICT DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELECTION ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNORS EQUALIZATION EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPENDITURES FAIR MARKET VALUE FEDERALISM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FISCAL AUTONOMY FISCAL CAPACITIES FISCAL CRISIS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL IMBALANCE FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL PERFORMANCE FISCAL RESOURCES FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL TRANSFERS FUTURES GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNOR GOVERNORS GROSS RECEIPTS HORIZONTAL EQUITY HORIZONTAL IMBALANCES INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT INTERNAL REVENUES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORM LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LEVY LOCAL CONSTITUENTS LOCAL DEVELOPMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL EXPENDITURES LOCAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL JURISDICTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS LOCAL REVENUES LOCAL TAXATION LOCAL TAXES LOWER HOUSE MAYOR MAYORS MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL MAYORS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL POLICIES NATIONAL TAXES NATIONAL TREASURY NATURAL RESOURCES PARTY DISCIPLINE POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY PRIORITIES POLITICAL CAPITAL POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL THEORY PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS PROPERTY OWNERS PROPERTY TAX PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL COUNCIL PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVINCIAL SALES PUBLIC DEBT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITIES REAL INTEREST REAL PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION REGULATORY POWER REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETURN REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS REVENUE CAPACITY REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE COLLECTIONS SALES TAX SECOND READING SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE GOVERNORS STATE LEGISLATURES SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING SUB-NATIONAL DEBTS SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX ASSIGNMENT TAX ASSIGNMENTS TAX BASES TAX BURDENS TAX EFFORT TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX PAYMENTS TAX REVENUES TAXATION THIRD READING TOTAL EXPENDITURE TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COST TRANSFER SYSTEM UPPER HOUSE |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE ASSETS BICAMERAL BODY CABINET CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CENTRALIZING CITIES CIVIL SOCIETY COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS CONVERSIONS DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE DEVOLUTION DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS DISTRICT DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELECTION ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNORS EQUALIZATION EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPENDITURES FAIR MARKET VALUE FEDERALISM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FISCAL AUTONOMY FISCAL CAPACITIES FISCAL CRISIS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL IMBALANCE FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL PERFORMANCE FISCAL RESOURCES FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL TRANSFERS FUTURES GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNOR GOVERNORS GROSS RECEIPTS HORIZONTAL EQUITY HORIZONTAL IMBALANCES INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT INTERNAL REVENUES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORM LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LEVY LOCAL CONSTITUENTS LOCAL DEVELOPMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL EXPENDITURES LOCAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL JURISDICTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS LOCAL REVENUES LOCAL TAXATION LOCAL TAXES LOWER HOUSE MAYOR MAYORS MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL MAYORS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL POLICIES NATIONAL TAXES NATIONAL TREASURY NATURAL RESOURCES PARTY DISCIPLINE POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY PRIORITIES POLITICAL CAPITAL POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL THEORY PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS PROPERTY OWNERS PROPERTY TAX PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL COUNCIL PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVINCIAL SALES PUBLIC DEBT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITIES REAL INTEREST REAL PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION REGULATORY POWER REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETURN REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS REVENUE CAPACITY REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE COLLECTIONS SALES TAX SECOND READING SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE GOVERNORS STATE LEGISLATURES SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING SUB-NATIONAL DEBTS SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX ASSIGNMENT TAX ASSIGNMENTS TAX BASES TAX BURDENS TAX EFFORT TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX PAYMENTS TAX REVENUES TAXATION THIRD READING TOTAL EXPENDITURE TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COST TRANSFER SYSTEM UPPER HOUSE Matsuda, Yasuhiko Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Philippines |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5792 |
| description |
In the Philippines' highly
decentralized political system, smooth functioning of
inter-governmental relations is key to effective service
delivery and good governance overall. Although considered a
milestone, the 1991 Local Government Code, the
Philippines' basic legislation governing
inter-governmental relations, contains provisions that
thwart vertical and horizontal resource equalization among
local government units, and contributes to mismatch between
expenditure assignments and the fiscal capacities of the
local government units. Numerous technical reports have
called for adjustments to the existing revenue and
expenditure assignments, yet no tangible progress has been
made. This paper assesses the prospects of legislative
reforms on the revenue side of the decentralization
framework. Using a variety of approaches ranging from a
historical analysis to institutional analysis of the
legislative dynamics in the Philippine congress, it assesses
the prospects of a major overhaul of the Local Government
Code and concludes that a significant reform is highly
unlikely under the conditions prevailing in the late 2010s.
By implication, any effort to improve the Philippines'
inter-governmental framework will have to settle for
sub-optimal incremental measures within the inefficient
revenue assignment arrangement. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Matsuda, Yasuhiko |
| author_facet |
Matsuda, Yasuhiko |
| author_sort |
Matsuda, Yasuhiko |
| title |
Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code |
| title_short |
Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code |
| title_full |
Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code |
| title_fullStr |
Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code |
| title_sort |
ripe for a big bang? assessing the political feasibility of legislative reforms in the philippines’ local government code |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110909084732 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3556 |
| _version_ |
1764387198483824640 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-35562021-04-23T14:02:10Z Ripe for a Big Bang? Assessing the Political Feasibility of Legislative Reforms in the Philippines’ Local Government Code Matsuda, Yasuhiko ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE ASSETS BICAMERAL BODY CABINET CANDIDATES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CENTRALIZING CITIES CIVIL SOCIETY COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS CONVERSIONS DECENTRALIZATION DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE DEVOLUTION DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS DISTRICT DISTRICTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELECTION ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNORS EQUALIZATION EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES EXPENDITURES FAIR MARKET VALUE FEDERALISM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FISCAL AUTONOMY FISCAL CAPACITIES FISCAL CRISIS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL IMBALANCE FISCAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL PERFORMANCE FISCAL RESOURCES FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FISCAL TRANSFERS FUTURES GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNOR GOVERNORS GROSS RECEIPTS HORIZONTAL EQUITY HORIZONTAL IMBALANCES INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT INTERNAL REVENUES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORM LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATOR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LEVY LOCAL CONSTITUENTS LOCAL DEVELOPMENT LOCAL ELECTIONS LOCAL EXPENDITURES LOCAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL JURISDICTIONS LOCAL OFFICIALS LOCAL POLITICIANS LOCAL REVENUES LOCAL TAXATION LOCAL TAXES LOWER HOUSE MAYOR MAYORS MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL MAYORS MUNICIPALITIES MUNICIPALITY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT NATIONAL LEGISLATORS NATIONAL POLICIES NATIONAL TAXES NATIONAL TREASURY NATURAL RESOURCES PARTY DISCIPLINE POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY PRIORITIES POLITICAL CAPITAL POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL THEORY PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS PROPERTY OWNERS PROPERTY TAX PROVINCE PROVINCES PROVINCIAL COUNCIL PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS PROVINCIAL LEVEL PROVINCIAL SALES PUBLIC DEBT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC UTILITIES REAL INTEREST REAL PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION REGULATORY POWER REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETURN REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS REVENUE CAPACITY REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE COLLECTIONS SALES TAX SECOND READING SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL WELFARE STATE GOVERNORS STATE LEGISLATURES SUB-NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING SUB-NATIONAL DEBTS SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX TAX ASSIGNMENT TAX ASSIGNMENTS TAX BASES TAX BURDENS TAX EFFORT TAX EXEMPTIONS TAX PAYMENTS TAX REVENUES TAXATION THIRD READING TOTAL EXPENDITURE TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COST TRANSFER SYSTEM UPPER HOUSE In the Philippines' highly decentralized political system, smooth functioning of inter-governmental relations is key to effective service delivery and good governance overall. Although considered a milestone, the 1991 Local Government Code, the Philippines' basic legislation governing inter-governmental relations, contains provisions that thwart vertical and horizontal resource equalization among local government units, and contributes to mismatch between expenditure assignments and the fiscal capacities of the local government units. Numerous technical reports have called for adjustments to the existing revenue and expenditure assignments, yet no tangible progress has been made. This paper assesses the prospects of legislative reforms on the revenue side of the decentralization framework. Using a variety of approaches ranging from a historical analysis to institutional analysis of the legislative dynamics in the Philippine congress, it assesses the prospects of a major overhaul of the Local Government Code and concludes that a significant reform is highly unlikely under the conditions prevailing in the late 2010s. By implication, any effort to improve the Philippines' inter-governmental framework will have to settle for sub-optimal incremental measures within the inefficient revenue assignment arrangement. 2012-03-19T18:04:34Z 2012-03-19T18:04:34Z 2011-09-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110909084732 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3556 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5792 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Philippines |