Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil
Financial incentives for students, teachers, and schools are often used to promote learning. Yet, little is known about whether similar incentives for mayors produce analogous findings. This paper investigates this question by exploring a results-b...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/691801610721382062/Incentives-for-Mayors-to-Improve-Learning-Evidence-from-state-reforms-in-Ceará-Brazil http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35024 |
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okr-10986-350242022-09-20T00:10:19Z Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil Lautharte, Ildo de Oliveira, Victor Hugo Loureiro, Andre EDUCATION RESULTS-BASED FINANCING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS TEACHER TRAINING SECONDARY EDUCATION LEARNING INCENTIVES MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE STUDENT PERFORMANCE Financial incentives for students, teachers, and schools are often used to promote learning. Yet, little is known about whether similar incentives for mayors produce analogous findings. This paper investigates this question by exploring a results-based financing reform in Ceará, Brazil, which redistributes state resources to municipalities based on education performance. Comparing schools on both sides of Ceará's border over key implementation periods, the paper shows that ninth grade students who were exposed to the results-based financing performed 0.15 standard deviation higher on mathematics and language tests. These impacts increase twofold when Ceará offers technical assistance to municipalities (pedagogical and managerial) and become significant for fifth graders. These gains are seen among students in the top performance quantiles, but reformulating the results-based financing rule to penalize municipalities with more low performers significantly reduces learning gaps. The paper discuss several mechanisms: the selection of school principals, teacher training, the provision and quality of textbooks, curriculum coverage, and school homework. 2021-01-21T14:36:24Z 2021-01-21T14:36:24Z 2021-01 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/691801610721382062/Incentives-for-Mayors-to-Improve-Learning-Evidence-from-state-reforms-in-Ceará-Brazil http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35024 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9509 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Brazil |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
EDUCATION RESULTS-BASED FINANCING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS TEACHER TRAINING SECONDARY EDUCATION LEARNING INCENTIVES MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE STUDENT PERFORMANCE |
| spellingShingle |
EDUCATION RESULTS-BASED FINANCING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS TEACHER TRAINING SECONDARY EDUCATION LEARNING INCENTIVES MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE STUDENT PERFORMANCE Lautharte, Ildo de Oliveira, Victor Hugo Loureiro, Andre Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Brazil |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9509 |
| description |
Financial incentives for students,
teachers, and schools are often used to promote learning.
Yet, little is known about whether similar incentives for
mayors produce analogous findings. This paper investigates
this question by exploring a results-based financing reform
in Ceará, Brazil, which redistributes state resources to
municipalities based on education performance. Comparing
schools on both sides of Ceará's border over key
implementation periods, the paper shows that ninth grade
students who were exposed to the results-based financing
performed 0.15 standard deviation higher on mathematics and
language tests. These impacts increase twofold when Ceará
offers technical assistance to municipalities (pedagogical
and managerial) and become significant for fifth graders.
These gains are seen among students in the top performance
quantiles, but reformulating the results-based financing
rule to penalize municipalities with more low performers
significantly reduces learning gaps. The paper discuss
several mechanisms: the selection of school principals,
teacher training, the provision and quality of textbooks,
curriculum coverage, and school homework. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Lautharte, Ildo de Oliveira, Victor Hugo Loureiro, Andre |
| author_facet |
Lautharte, Ildo de Oliveira, Victor Hugo Loureiro, Andre |
| author_sort |
Lautharte, Ildo |
| title |
Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil |
| title_short |
Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil |
| title_full |
Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil |
| title_fullStr |
Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Incentives for Mayors to Improve Learning : Evidence from State Reforms in Ceará, Brazil |
| title_sort |
incentives for mayors to improve learning : evidence from state reforms in ceará, brazil |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/691801610721382062/Incentives-for-Mayors-to-Improve-Learning-Evidence-from-state-reforms-in-Ceará-Brazil http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35024 |
| _version_ |
1764482161711251456 |