Reforming and Rebuilding Lebanon's Port Sector : Lessons from Global Best Practices
On August 4, 2020, a massive explosion in the Port of Beirut (PoB) devastated the city, killing at least 200 people, wounding thousands, and displacing around 300,000. A Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), prepared by the World Bank in cooper...
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Format: | Report |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/823691609795908583/Reforming-and-Rebuilding-Lebanons-Port-Sector-Lessons-from-Global-Best-Practices http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34989 |
Summary: | On August 4, 2020, a massive explosion
in the Port of Beirut (PoB) devastated the city, killing at
least 200 people, wounding thousands, and displacing around
300,000. A Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA),
prepared by the World Bank in cooperation with the United
Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), estimated damage
to the port at about 350 million dollars. This Note was
prepared by the World Bank to provide guidance to policy
makers in Lebanon on the crucial additional requirements to
be undertaken in the rebuilding of the PoB in terms of both
improving its resilience and addressing the underlying
governance concerns that are broadly acknowledged to have
contributed to the tragedy. The Note summarizes global best
practices in port management and border management reforms.
The PoB is the main gateway for the external trade of
Lebanon, but it has failed in the key role as an enabler of
economic development in the country. Despite the growth in
volumes and revenues in the port over the last 10-15 years,
the PoB has evidently failed to guarantee safe and efficient
operations, and to undertake the necessary long-term
planning for the benefit of the port and the country. More
importantly it has underperformed in its key role as an
enabler of economic development at a national level and has
made a limited contribution to fostering socio-economic
development more broadly. These failures are a direct result
of the current governance framework of the PoB. Lebanon
adheres to a port management system that arguably reflects
the complex political-economic realities, and which as a
result run counter to many recognized good practices. The
governance of the sector is a patchwork of ad-hoc
institutions, structures, laws and regulations that preclude
the development of a coherent integrated strategy. The
current framework inhibits efficiency as several key
government agencies for transport, trade, and border
management have overlapping mandates, divergent strategies,
often operate under outdated processes and regulations and
do not coordinate among themselves. Since 1990, the PoB has
been managed by a temporary administrative committee,
established in a legal vacuum. This has resulted in serious
governance, transparency, and accountability issues. The
Lebanese Customs is not structured to perform its mission
properly. Its two parallel institutions, the Higher Council
for Customs and the Customs Directorate have proven to be
inefficient and subject to political exploitation and power
struggles. The tragic explosion in PoB clearly illustrates
the evident shortcomings of the current institutional set-up
as well as the risks emanating from the no-reform scenario. |
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