Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services
Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries. In a "high-level" equilibrium, the quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff wel...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110630160244 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3487 |
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okr-10986-34872021-04-23T14:02:10Z Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services Strand, Jon AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY ALLOCATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION CAPITAL COSTS CASH FLOW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CONNECTIONS CONSUMERS COST RECOVERY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION DEEP WELLS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ELECTRICITY EQUILIBRIUM EXCESS WATER FORMAL ANALYSIS FUNCTIONAL FORMS FUTURE RESEARCH GAME THEORY GROUNDWATER HOUSEHOLDS INCOME GROUPS INDIFFERENCE CURVES INEFFICIENCY LDCS LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES LOW WATER LOW WATER PRESSURE MARGINAL REVENUE NASH EQUILIBRIUM POLITICAL ECONOMY POTABLE WATER PRICE INCENTIVES PRICE OF WATER PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE UTILITY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC UTILITY QUALITY OF SERVICE ROADS RURAL WATER RURAL WATER SUPPLY SANITATION SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE IMPROVEMENT SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SEWERAGE SEWERAGE SERVICE TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL COSTS URBAN RESIDENTS URBAN WATER USER CHARGES UTILITIES UTILITY EMPLOYEES UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY MANAGEMENT UTILITY REVENUES UTILITY SERVICES UTILITY STAFF VALUE OF WATER WAGES WATER DEMAND WATER PRICES WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SERVICE WATER UTILITY WELLS Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries. In a "high-level" equilibrium, the quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff well paid in order to induce high quality of performance. In a "low-level" equilibrium the opposite is the case. Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of utility management, and public perceptions about service quality. If a utility administration has the potential to offer high-quality service, and the public is aware of this, high-quality equilibrium also requires the public s service payments to be high enough to fund the needed pay incentives for the utility staff. When the public lack knowledge about the utility administration s quality, the public s initial beliefs about the utility administration s quality also will influence their willingness to make adequate service payments for a high-quality equilibrium. This paper shows that, with low confidence, only a low-level equilibrium may exist; while with higher initial confidence, a high-level equilibrium become possible. "Intermediate" (in between the low- and high-level) outcomes also can occur in early periods, with "high-level" outcomes later on. 2012-03-19T18:03:20Z 2012-03-19T18:03:20Z 2011-06-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110630160244 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3487 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5723 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY ALLOCATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION CAPITAL COSTS CASH FLOW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CONNECTIONS CONSUMERS COST RECOVERY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION DEEP WELLS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ELECTRICITY EQUILIBRIUM EXCESS WATER FORMAL ANALYSIS FUNCTIONAL FORMS FUTURE RESEARCH GAME THEORY GROUNDWATER HOUSEHOLDS INCOME GROUPS INDIFFERENCE CURVES INEFFICIENCY LDCS LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES LOW WATER LOW WATER PRESSURE MARGINAL REVENUE NASH EQUILIBRIUM POLITICAL ECONOMY POTABLE WATER PRICE INCENTIVES PRICE OF WATER PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE UTILITY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC UTILITY QUALITY OF SERVICE ROADS RURAL WATER RURAL WATER SUPPLY SANITATION SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE IMPROVEMENT SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SEWERAGE SEWERAGE SERVICE TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL COSTS URBAN RESIDENTS URBAN WATER USER CHARGES UTILITIES UTILITY EMPLOYEES UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY MANAGEMENT UTILITY REVENUES UTILITY SERVICES UTILITY STAFF VALUE OF WATER WAGES WATER DEMAND WATER PRICES WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SERVICE WATER UTILITY WELLS |
| spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGGREGATE SUPPLY ALLOCATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION CAPITAL COSTS CASH FLOW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION CONNECTIONS CONSUMERS COST RECOVERY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION DEEP WELLS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC THEORY ELECTRICITY EQUILIBRIUM EXCESS WATER FORMAL ANALYSIS FUNCTIONAL FORMS FUTURE RESEARCH GAME THEORY GROUNDWATER HOUSEHOLDS INCOME GROUPS INDIFFERENCE CURVES INEFFICIENCY LDCS LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL TAXES LOW WATER LOW WATER PRESSURE MARGINAL REVENUE NASH EQUILIBRIUM POLITICAL ECONOMY POTABLE WATER PRICE INCENTIVES PRICE OF WATER PRIVATE OWNERSHIP PRIVATE UTILITY PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC UTILITY QUALITY OF SERVICE ROADS RURAL WATER RURAL WATER SUPPLY SANITATION SERVICE DELIVERY SERVICE IMPROVEMENT SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SEWERAGE SEWERAGE SERVICE TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL COSTS URBAN RESIDENTS URBAN WATER USER CHARGES UTILITIES UTILITY EMPLOYEES UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY MANAGEMENT UTILITY REVENUES UTILITY SERVICES UTILITY STAFF VALUE OF WATER WAGES WATER DEMAND WATER PRICES WATER RESOURCES WATER SECTOR WATER SERVICE WATER UTILITY WELLS Strand, Jon Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5723 |
| description |
Heterogeneity of public utility services
is common in developing countries. In a
"high-level" equilibrium, the quality of utility
services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services
is high, the utility is well funded and staff well paid in
order to induce high quality of performance. In a
"low-level" equilibrium the opposite is the case.
Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of
utility management, and public perceptions about service
quality. If a utility administration has the potential to
offer high-quality service, and the public is aware of this,
high-quality equilibrium also requires the public s service
payments to be high enough to fund the needed pay incentives
for the utility staff. When the public lack knowledge about
the utility administration s quality, the public s initial
beliefs about the utility administration s quality also will
influence their willingness to make adequate service
payments for a high-quality equilibrium. This paper shows
that, with low confidence, only a low-level equilibrium may
exist; while with higher initial confidence, a high-level
equilibrium become possible. "Intermediate" (in
between the low- and high-level) outcomes also can occur in
early periods, with "high-level" outcomes later on. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Strand, Jon |
| author_facet |
Strand, Jon |
| author_sort |
Strand, Jon |
| title |
Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services |
| title_short |
Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services |
| title_full |
Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services |
| title_fullStr |
Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Low-Level Versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services |
| title_sort |
low-level versus high-level equilibrium in public utility services |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110630160244 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3487 |
| _version_ |
1764387079826964480 |