Biased Policy Professionals
Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a nov...
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Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
2020
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34864 |
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okr-10986-348642021-04-23T14:02:10Z Biased Policy Professionals Banuri, Sheheryar Dercon, Stefan Gauri, Varun BIAS DECISION MAKING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS CONFIRMATION BIAS FRAMING POLICY PROFESSIONAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TECHNOCRAT Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision-making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and, most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases. 2020-12-03T19:34:23Z 2020-12-03T19:34:23Z 2019-06 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34864 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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BIAS DECISION MAKING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS CONFIRMATION BIAS FRAMING POLICY PROFESSIONAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TECHNOCRAT |
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BIAS DECISION MAKING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS CONFIRMATION BIAS FRAMING POLICY PROFESSIONAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TECHNOCRAT Banuri, Sheheryar Dercon, Stefan Gauri, Varun Biased Policy Professionals |
| description |
Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision-making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and, most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases. |
| format |
Journal Article |
| author |
Banuri, Sheheryar Dercon, Stefan Gauri, Varun |
| author_facet |
Banuri, Sheheryar Dercon, Stefan Gauri, Varun |
| author_sort |
Banuri, Sheheryar |
| title |
Biased Policy Professionals |
| title_short |
Biased Policy Professionals |
| title_full |
Biased Policy Professionals |
| title_fullStr |
Biased Policy Professionals |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Biased Policy Professionals |
| title_sort |
biased policy professionals |
| publisher |
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34864 |
| _version_ |
1764481817888423936 |